


JPRS-EER-89-027
17 MARCH 1989



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

East Europe

East Europe

JPRS-EER-89-027

CONTENTS

17 MARCH 1989

POLITICAL

INTRABLOC

- Albanian Writer's 'Anti-Yugoslav' Views Condemned [*Pristina RILINDJA* 6 Dec] 1

BULGARIA

- French Press Comments on Mitterrand Visit, Glasnost 2
Impressions, Responsibilities [*Paris LIBERATION* 20 Jan] 2
Press, Political Changes [*Paris LIBERATION* 18 Jan] 3
Mitterrand Meets 'Dissidents' [*Paris LE FIGARO* 20 Jan] 4

HUNGARY

- Soviet Says 'Neutral' Hungary No Threat [*Paris LE MONDE* 18 Feb] 5

YUGOSLAVIA

- Problems Facing Defense Minister Reviewed [*DANAS* 27 Dec] 6
Remzi Kolgeci Interviewed on Kosovo Issues [*DANAS* 20 Dec] 8
Better Representation of Kosovo in Diplomatic Corps Urged [*RILINDJA* 12 Dec] 14
Pavlovic Book Criticizing Serbian Party Operations Reviewed [*DANAS* 20 Dec] 15

MILITARY

INTRABLOC

- Warsaw Pact Invasion Capability Assessed [*Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UNE TECHNIK* Dec] 18

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

- Overview of NVA Political Training Provided
[*Bonn INFORMATIONEN FUER DIE TRUPPE* Dec] 24

ECONOMIC

ALBANIA

- Ministry Blamed for Losses of Pyrite Concentrate [*ZERI I POPULLIT* 5 Oct] 30
Efforts To Utilize Nonmetallic Minerals [*ZERI I POPULLIT* 20 Sep] 31

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

- New Containership Class Described [*SEEWIRTSCHAFT* Nov] 32

HUNGARY

- Diversified Bond Market to Test Investor Attitudes [*HETI VILAGGAZDASAG* 21 Jan] 41

YUGOSLAVIA

- Statistics on Increasing Nationwide Unemployment [*EKONOMSKA POLITIKA* 26 Dec] 43

INTRABLOC

Albanian Writer's 'Anti-Yugoslav' Views Condemned

21000009 Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian
6 Dec 88 p 14

[Article by G. Ranitoviq: "The Winter of Ismail Kadare"]

[Text] The well-known Albanian writer, Ismail Kadare, has again cast venom against Yugoslavia. In his latest novel, "Koncert ne Fund te Dimrit" [A Concert at the End of Winter], this talented writer treats the scenario of Enver Hoxha's conflict with China and the purges in Albania in 1970, in which Yugoslav "spies" were given a prominent place.

Belgrade, 5 December

Once again, as he has already done, time after time, Ismail Kadare, the foremost name in neighboring Albania's literature—his works have been translated into 30 languages—has placed his literary talent at the service of the Tirana regime and its anti-Yugoslav propaganda. This author, well known by Yugoslav readers for his brilliant novels, "Gjenerali i Ushtrise se Vdekur" [The General of the Dead Army] (published by "Noliti" in Belgrade and by "Bagdalla" in Krushevac), "Keshjtjella" [The Castle], and "Kronike ne Gur" [Chronicle in Stone], but also for his not infrequent anti-Yugoslav pamphlets, has again faithfully done his homework.

In his latest published novel, "Koncert ne Fund te Dimrit," Ismail Kadare has assiduously treated the Albanian leadership's official version of the conflict between Tirana and Peking in the 1970's, but, at the same time, this work is rich in anti-Yugoslav remarks (as was the case in his previous novel, "Dimri i Madh" [The Great Winter], in which the Soviet-Albanian disagreements were described). Ismail Kadare is unable, as it were, to free himself from the Enver Hoxha syndrome—the idea that Yugoslavia is responsible for all the difficulties of Albania, and that the Yugoslav "revisionists" and spies are continually working for the destruction of Enver Hoxha and his country.

Threats Against Yugoslavia

In this quite voluminous work, in 18 chapters, Ismail Kadare treats artistically the now well-known ideas of Enver Hoxha regarding the espionage plot of China, Yugoslavia, and the great powers against Albania, while attempting, at the same time, to introduce a bit more of the "romantic" spirit of the Albanian, in order to detach it from the political scenario of Enver Hoxha. In this novel, there is a—so to speak—faithful treatment of the official version of the "treachery" of Beqir Balluku, the minister of defense, at the beginning of the 1970's (Beqir Balluku, who, until then, was Enver Hoxha's right-hand man, suffered in Enver's purges).

There is a presentation in this work of a conversation between the Albanian minister and CEL (easily understood as standing for the former premier of China, Chou En-lai), who tells the minister that the role of the party in Albania is too great and suggests that the "false holiness" needs to be demolished. CEL, at the same time, lets the minister know that he has been informed of several conversations of his with the Soviets in 1960. This "surprised him"—explains Kadare—and made it occur to him that the Soviets were using blackmail against him because of certain conversations with the Yugoslavs in 1947, and the first thing that entered his mind was the question of "why the Yugoslavs had betrayed him, and for what price."

The minister, as is pointed out, realizes that now CEL is also blackmailing him: the Chinese tells him that at the beginning he must perform an ordinary task: to surround a party committee, and then the people "will take over." The minister, CEL's "agent," obeys, and during military exercises, gives the order to surround a party committee, but the officers pay no attention and inform Enver Hoxha. In this way, the minister did his work, precisely as in the official version of the "treachery" of General Beqir Balluku, according to which Chou En-lai "used blackmail to threaten Enver Hoxha, if he would not come to terms with regard to doing services for the Yugoslavs."

Almost the whole of Ismail Kadare's book is skillfully permeated with anti-Yugoslav sentiment. Gjergj Dibra, the diplomatic courier, for example, meditates that the day will come "when they will also come into conflict with Yugoslavia" and when "revenge will be taken for what they call Kosove."

At another point, Silva is reminded by the minister that separation from the Chinese occurred "quietly," from the Soviets "with nervousness and tense circumstances." But with the Yugoslavs—"I was a pupil then, it was cold, the morning was rainy, when the principal of the school came out on the balcony and told us: 'Children, Tito duped us.'"

There is also a conversation between an Albanian and Krems, the Portuguese, who can never understand the insistence of Albania on talks on Kosovo and giving a priority to "romantic nationalism" in the daily exploitation of the working class. But the Albanian erupts at such indifference on the part of the Portuguese toward the nation and fatherland of the Albanians, and seeks to turn the conversation to the "genocide" against the Albanians in Kosovo.

Even when Ismail Kadare treats the spy at the North Pole, he is preoccupied with Yugoslavia and does not hesitate to compare Tito even with the Spanish dictator, Franco. This spy discusses various themes: "You think that after Tito's death there will not be changes in Yugoslavia." The answer is "heard" from him: "as happened in Spain after Franco."

Although he is considered to be a writer from the courtyard of the former dictator in Tirana, Ismail Kadare knows Yugoslav reality well. But he also knows the tragic fate of all those from the retinue of Enver Hoxha who have tried to speak the truth. Even this talented writer is afraid for his own skin, and therefore, with all his strength and talent, strives to show himself servile to his masters, while ignoring the fact that his readers will one day execrate him because of the miserable way he has described the victims of Enver Hoxha's terror.

This novel by Ismail Kadare came off the press on the eve of the first discussions, in a long time, among writers from the Balkan countries in Bor, at which Ismail Kadare was also present. He, as a diplomat, spoke beautifully about cooperation among the Balkan peoples, asking writers to overcome "misfortune" and "dark forces." The hosts did not ask why he writes pamphlets about Yugoslavia and makes anti-Yugoslav statements, such as "Serbia is full of chauvinists," saying that in Yugoslavia there is a leap to "anti-Albanian history," and that "Kosovo republic" is a reasonable demand. Only the words of two of our country's writers remain to be noted: Miodrag Bulatovic, with whom Ismail Kadare was inseparable in Bor (although two years ago he called him a "Great Serb chauvinist"), declared: "Why ask him about statements that he has perhaps been obliged to make in such a way?"

At the same time, Bozhin Pavlovski told the journalists: "It is really a shame that such a great writer is used for propaganda purposes."

BULGARIA

French Press Comments on Mitterrand Visit, Glasnost

Impressions, Responsibilities

29000016 Paris *LIBERATION* in French 20 Jan 89 p 9

[Article by Fredy Foscolo, bachelor of laws, instructor in Eastern languages, contributor to NOUVELLE ALTER-NATIVE: "Bulgarian Tastes"]

[Text] What image do people in Metropolitan France have of the Bulgarians? Probably they think they are Tartars with guttural accents, brandishing deadly umbrellas; Pope-killers dressed in animal skins, cavorting on our TV screens to boast of the merits of some dairy product brands.

At a moment when France is at last expressing some kind of determination toward Central and Eastern Europe; at the moment when Francois Mitterrand is undertaking a rather subdued but necessary visit to Bulgaria, it is indeed a good idea to recall some truths about that old nation in Europe.

Bulgaria has been in Europe for 13 centuries. In the Bulgarian Empire, that touched the Empire of Charlemagne, there lived men who created the first monuments of Slavic literature. In this way, they gave the Russia of Kiev the art of writing. Bulgarian scholars, who had been in already at the beginning of the Catharian Movement and then the Hesychastian School, thus also contributed to the eruption of the Renaissance in Italy. Abandoned to Ottoman rule for 5 centuries, this nation however did manage to preserve its identity. More recently, amid the torment of World War II, Bulgaria—alone in Europe with Denmark—managed to keep its Jewish citizens out of range of Nazi furor.

Having noted this, Bulgaria was neither more, nor less complaisant in accepting the harness of the regime that was predestined for it at Yalta. This country did not experience the post-Stalinist upheavals that shook Budapest, Prague, or Gdansk above all because it had risen up while Stalin was still alive. Neither through heroism, nor out of any particular conviction, but by virtue of the simple survival reflex. The peculiar feature of Bulgarian society up to the end of this first half of the century is that it had neither an aristocracy, nor a land-owning or industry oligarchy. Indeed, 80 percent of the population consist of rural merchants, craftsmen, and above all farmers who own their piece of land.

By imposing immediate and total Sovietization starting in 1947, the Bulgarian Communist Party deliberately challenged the country's historical, economic, and social realities. By consciously despoiling four-fifths of the population, it deliberately triggered spontaneous, scattered, unorganized but massive resistance which it immediately attempted to repress with all the brutality of that epoch's triumphant Stalinism.

The 110,000 Bulgarians who, between 1946 and 1956, were held in the country's 76 camps and prisons, the 30,000 who were murdered and disappeared during that period of time, the 7,000 who were sentenced to death and who were executed—they all bear witness to the violence of this vanguard normalization. At the moment when Nikita Khrushchev stepped up to the podium of the 20th Congress, civilian society in Bulgaria had already been shattered, its elites had been decimated, its verve had been crushed for several decades.

History, as we know, does not have any morals. I, for my part, have a moral history to present. This happened in the Stara-Zagora prison on 10 October 1969. The prison warden had assembled the 500 shackled political prisoners. The pools of blood, left in the hallways by the prison uprising the night before, had just been completely swabbed away. The local prosecutor came quickly and looked around furiously. He ended the diatribe, which he had addressed to us, with these words: "...and do not forget, we took this power with blood and we will give it up only in blood..." Everybody of course understood that this was our blood he was talking about.

This story is addressed to all those who, in Bulgaria over more than 40 years, built their power without sharing it, enjoying exorbitant privileges on the basis of this legitimate status.

As it happened 40 years ago, as it happened 20 years ago, and even more so today, the people in the house across the way need us. We have the right and also the duty to interfere in their domestic affairs not only to provide our technology and our capital for the drifting economy of the Bulgarian People's Republic but above all to come to the aid of a sorely tried and nascent civilian society by giving it the succor of our resolute sympathy, our active liberty, and the force of our voices.

This is not so much a question of the heart but rather a matter of good common sense. Whether we like it or not, the success of the Europe of the Twelve, somewhere down the road, implies the materialization of the real Europe. It is high time for the East to perceive this truth. Rich and democratic Europe sooner or later is doomed to receive its poor relations. In its name, they denied the dignity of the other, they rejected any idea of dialogue, they refused to grant civilian society the least little bit of autonomy.

Press, Political Changes

29000016 Paris *LIBERATION* in French
18 Jan 89 p 21

[Article by Veronique Soule: "The Hesitation Waltz of Bulgarian Transparency"]

[Text] Bulgaria has adopted a series of administrative and economic reforms. But it has moved ahead cautiously in the field of democratization. The press quickly had to pull back from its initial audacious sallies.

Francois Mitterrand is scheduled to arrive in Sofia today for an official 48-hour visit, the first by a French chief of state to Bulgaria. In the context of the new Eastern Policy, the president intends to strengthen France's presence and to encourage the signs of change now in progress in the "Other Europe." The winds of reform are blowing more timidly in Bulgaria than in Moscow. Here is the last part of our survey.

Sofia: Special Correspondent

"We have no Glasnost here. We miss it terribly." This statement, made to us in confidence by a Sofia intellectual, who spends entire nights devouring the Soviet press, reflects the ever-present frustration. Like its "Big Brother," Bulgaria today preaches transparency but a "Bulgarian-style Glasnost," measured and laced with optimism.

"In the past, people accused us of imitating the USSR in everything. Now people reproach us for not imitating it as much," was the ironic statement made by Evgeni Stanchev, assistant editor in chief of POGLED, the

weekly of the Union of Journalists, today the cutting edge of Glasnost. "Often, Western journalists ask me about the progress of perestroika in Bulgaria. But here we have preustroystvo. The two words have common roots but different nuances."

Without daring to defy "Big Brother," like the East German leaders, Sofia kept its distance somewhat. With a certain degree of haste, Bulgaria did adopt a series of administrative and economic reforms. The entire administrative structure has thus been turned upside down, the 28 departments were replaced by 9 regions and some 30,000 civil servants were transferred to local agencies of government.

But the pace of change is definitely more moderate in the field of democratization. The name of Brezhnev has disappeared discreetly from the Kremikovtsi Metallurgical Combine, near Sofia, and the statue of Zhivkov, enthroned in the center of his home village of Pravets, has been taken off its pedestal. Multiple candidacies (all sponsored by the Fatherland Front) have also been introduced into the municipal elections. And the press managed to do away with some taboos on crime or prostitution although this was far from the bubbling Soviet style.

Officially, two reasons are given for this slow pace. First of all, the Bulgarians think, without any complex of any kind, that they started "at a point not as low as the Soviets." Long before Soviet Glasnost, their press denounced the female sales clerks in the stores who were dipping into the stocks, the shortage of certain products, the lack of housing, the slow ways of the bureaucracy, etc.

Next, the Bulgarian journalists, trained by 40 years of directives that came from "up high," had trouble adjusting to the "new era." "The process should now be speeded up. But for that, the journalists would have to liberate themselves," said Lyuben Genov, editor in chief of the labor union daily TRUD. "For example, in our newspaper, we are going to attribute one column to each journalist to make him responsible. We must introduce professionalism, we must teach the journalists to go look for information."

We must add a third reason to the caution inherent in Bulgarian Glasnost: the "specificity" of the regime. In power since 1954, Todor Zhivkov, 77 years old, chief of state and head of the party, today holds the longevity record among bloc leaders. While he did jump on the bandwagon, he nevertheless remains one of the last dinosaurs of the old guard who are still in place.

That results in a major inconvenience; while the Soviet press pell-mell denounces all of the ills inherited from the period of (Brezhnevian) "stagnation," these past 30 years remain practically unassailable in Bulgaria. The

party now admits that it made mistakes but those mistakes are somewhere in the fuzzy past and are not blamed on any particular person.

Like economic restructuring, Glasnost in Bulgaria moved along at a somewhat jerky pace. After Sofia rallied to perestroika, changes were marked by a certain audacity, an apparent waltz-hesitation, and much confusion—for example, ministries were simply eliminated, to be replaced by associations to which new ministries were later added.

The year 1987 brought an abrupt opening in the press. Todor Zhivkov speeded preustroystvo up and from that moment on, all communists sang the praises of restructuring. Impatient to imitate their Soviet brothers, journalists became bold. Certain newspapers, such as NARODNA KULTURA or LITERATUREN FRONT, became champions of Glasnost, more, it seems, under the impetus from their editors in chief rather than from a coordinated decision.

The two cultural magazines are fighting above all for transparency; they keep increasing the reprints of critical Soviet articles, particularly challenging the past, committing themselves to the defense of the city of Ruse, which has been polluted by the Romanian plant at Giurgiu (see LIBERATION, Wednesday, 17 January). Today, the intellectual members of the Club for the Defense of Glasnost and of Perestroika deplore the fact that these two newspapers are nothing but shadows of their former selves.

Their respective editors in chief were given their walking papers in 1988. Officially, they took retirement in accordance with the new policy that is designed to make room for young people. Semi-officially, they reportedly fell victim to the cleanout that was observed this year especially with the elimination, in July, of the possible successor to Zhivkov, a man by the name of Chudomir Aleksandrov, a proclaimed reformist.

The Bulgarian leaders keep close tabs on the latest upheavals in the power struggle at the very top in the Soviet Union and probably engage in the same calculation as some of their counterparts in the East. What good does it do to take useless risks and to commit yourself too much, if Gorbachev were to lose in the end? In this context, an uncontrolled Glasnost is dangerous.

Georgi Tambuev, the minstrel and victim of Glasnost, paid the price for the dark game being played in Bulgaria. A party member, this journalist who worked for TRUD in June 1987 published a series of reports entitled "Corruption in the Seats of Power" which created a big stir. For the first time in Bulgaria, officials—a prosecutor and a deputy manager of the cooperative in the town of Etropole, near Sofia—were charged, by name, of having abused their office and embezzled funds.

The two officials were fired and kicked out of the Communist Party but they appealed to the party's Control Commission. That commission conducted an investigation for 6 months. Its members concluded that Tambuev had displayed "levity" based on malicious witness testimony that could not be checked out. The journalist was expelled from the party in March 1988 and the two officials were reinstated in their jobs.

"We need time." "The economic reform is moving ahead." "We must take into account our specific characteristics." These arguments, introduced by officials to justify the pace of preustroystvo, boil down to a very real problem, the reluctance of the middle-level civil service, as touched on by Zhivkov during the plenum last December. Thus, the reorganization of the press, decided by the Politburo in July 1988, is running into some resistance.

The best-informed intellectuals explain that it is necessary today to look for Glasnost in marginal magazines with a poor circulation. They mention the magazine SOCIETY AND JURISPRUDENCE which continues to reprint "radical" articles from the Soviet press or the literary magazine FAKEL (Torch) which began the publication of the work "Dr Zhivago."

The Soviet press by far remains the most desirable. Bulgaria is proud of being the socialist country which, in relation to its population, is best supplied with the Soviet press—everyday, they get 160,000 copies of PRAVDA—whereas Russian newspapers are difficult to find.

Unable to read them, the people of Sofia circulate the wildest rumors. One day it was said that a Soviet newspaper had published the list of salaries of all the No 1 men of the bloc. In fact, this was a question put to Mikhail Gorbachev regarding his own earnings.

Mitterrand Meets 'Dissidents'

29000016 Paris LE FIGARO in French 20 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by Paul Guilbert: "Mitterrand Listened to Dissidents"]

[Text] Bulgaria—the end of the visit of the French president—Mitterrand listens to dissidents. The French chief of state had breakfast with opponents of the regime now in power and with students.

During his stay in Bulgaria, which ended in Sofia last night, following a visit to Plovdiv, where he entered the home of Lamartine, Mitterrand drew the conclusion that the end of the century will not come without some important changes in relations between the two Europes, particularly from the viewpoint of movement. Is this the end of this separation?

"I have confidence in the movement of history today. This is a political prospect that depends on the will of some men. The people are ready for it," replied the

president; we could not really say that his Bulgarian counterpart, Mr Zhivkov, who brusquely rejects "the postulate of political pluralism," justifies this Mitterrandian optimism.

In this respect, their joint press conference was a caricature of the misunderstanding between the men. On what scenes from his trip does Mitterrand base his intuition?

Breakfast with opponents at the French Embassy has become a rite during the Mitterrandian journey to the Other Europe; this is the way to express attention to human rights under the new policy of opening toward the East. Oboriche Street in Sofia is crowded with cops; in uniform or in mufti—but you can still spot them—every 100 m; Mitterrand's visitors do not go unnoticed. In the embassy dining room, Mitterrand, rigid like an icon, talks little. "I am here to listen to you," he says, and then he adds cautiously that "the occasion perhaps will not arise for some time to come."

Odd Animals

The twelve around him, intellectuals and artists, speak out by turns in a rather tinged, almost Byzantine manner so that Mitterrand can find neither precise denunciations, nor the corrosive humor of the Czech dissidents which he had gotten in Prague. His invited guests in Sofia above all appeared careful to protect the Bulgarian reputation, refusing in advance to have the foreigner look upon them like odd animals, expecting him to understand all their aspirations rather than pick up their criticisms of the regime: "Bulgaria is a very complex country," said one of them, "even for us!"

All declared flattered by their meeting with a president of the republic, some reminded him that "we are no further from France than from Poland, especially in the cultural area." Taking up the matter of the political system, one of these unfortunates blurted out: "The only real enemy I met is not censorship but rather self-censorship." While others made like they were going to protest, all maintained that the Gorbachev line is their only chance for salvation. Thus, the two images of Gorbachev—"enlightener of the future"—and of Mitterrand who received Walesa in Paris, the two symbols of nearby Russia and of idealized France, have formed in the Bulgarian mind a strange synthesis which the French president, still openly enraptured, had not expected.

Are they really opponents? They are, rather, renewers, anxious to express themselves and to act within the context of legality, people who have not come there to express their recriminations but to look for grounds for encouragement: "What a fantastic lesson of optimism," said novelist Blaga Dimitrova upon leaving the embassy. For his part, Mitterrand saw this as a justification of his policy: present the image of France with an exhortation to dialogue, without interference in practical operations, nor without any lessons to teach.

Honorary Doctor

Another well-established rite of the trip to the East involved the meeting at the university. At the Klement Okhridski University—where the hallways and the auditoriums were jammed with students—the president was quickly draped with a black toga with garnet facings before being made honorary doctor through the magic of a formula in Slavic which is promptly lost in the outburst of cheers. Mitterrand picks up the topic of "free movement by students, professors, and ideas throughout Europe" which demands the lifting of dogmatic barriers and "how do you say it again? Eh? Transparency? That means that we go to meet each other and that light passes through." As he mentions Glasnost, applause sweeps the auditorium.

As in Bratislava, Mitterrand then invites questions from the students; but they are so countless, so tumultuous, and insolent, you would not believe it. If there is anything moving in Bulgaria, it is the younger generation. Here is an example: What do you think of the state of democracy at the end of your visit? Mitterrand: "The interesting thing here is the question, not the answer." Vigorous applause: everybody understands. What are your relations with the French Communist Party? Mitterrand: "The union is a struggle." So, he brought the house down.

Effrontery

A bold sociologist did not hesitate to ask the president why—having the Legion of Honor himself—he gave it to Zhivkov: "What are the requirements for this award?" This effrontery is followed by another one, likewise aimed at the master of Bulgaria who is now 76 years old. Is it a good idea to entrust matters of state to aged men? Mitterrand, directly touched by this himself, replied in a humorous vein: "It is good that there are people in the prime of life who can handle these things but, if not..." And so, the president was able to pass his second test, really enjoying the moment, with an extraordinary vivacity in dealing with an audience the likes of which he would not find in the West.

Looking back over these two moments in his journey, the breakfast at the university, he concluded happily: "It suffices to lift the lid..."

HUNGARY

Soviet Says 'Neutral' Hungary No Threat

29000020b Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Feb 89 p 3

[Article: "Soviet Academician Says 'Neutral' Hungary Would Not be a Threat to USSR"]

[Text] Budapest—The big Hungarian daily MAGYAR NEMZET published on Thursday 9 February an account by MTI, the official press agency, of statements made at a press conference in Moscow by the academician Oleg

Bogomolov, director of the Institute for Socialist World Research. The Soviet academician was questioned by a Western journalist about the possibility of Hungary choosing a democratic, Western system. Here was his response:

"If we assume, hypothetically, that fundamental political and economic changes in Hungary led to something close to the Austrian or Swedish system, in my opinion that would not bar Hungary from remaining in the Warsaw Pact, and thus would not constitute a threat to the USSR. Neither would it present a threat if Hungary chose to be neutral, precisely because of its neutrality. Naturally, these are strictly hypothetical assumptions."

"Regarding the renovation of socialism," MTI continued, "the academician said that it is not the principles of socialism which are in crisis, but the forms in which several countries have been constrained to accept it. The new model of socialist society has not yet been born, but several things already stand out in the economic domain..."

"On the subject of multiparty politics, Mr Bogomolov noted that the multiparty systems currently existing in some socialist countries cannot be considered a step forward, since those parties function in the shadow of the PC [Communist Party] and are thus confined to a secondary role. Competition between the parties might be a step forward. But the important question is whether that is the real solution or merely a vehicle for progress."

"A multiparty system," MTI said, "has both advantages and drawbacks. The leadership of the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] understands this and is taking a cautious approach. The academician added that in the Soviet Union a pluralistic party system was not on the agenda in practical terms, even though theoretical studies are currently under way."

YUGOSLAVIA

Problems Facing Defense Minister Reviewed
28000062a Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
27 Dec 88 pp 18-19

[Article by Aleksandar Tijanic: "Tango, Or—March"; first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] Judging from all indications, Kadijevic is "a general of continuity," supported by the top military brass and a large part of the civilian leadership.

Malicious tongues are saying that the fellow countrymen, Stipe Suvar and Gen Veljko Kadijevic, personify the model for overcoming the crisis, colloquially known as the "Imotski potpourri"! However, the draft project of the head of the federal party to increase contiguity does not, for the majority of people, have the appeal of a tango, nor does the defense minister tend towards the behavior of a marching band leader. At least thus far!

We are not simply talking about the traditional hardness of hearing of people born in the Imotski region, but rather about the fact that with their selection to these posts, Suvar and Kadijevic have inherited two seemingly worthwhile tasks. First, to unite the Yugoslav communist parties, and thus to make some sort of "communist Internationale" into a unified party. Secondly, given an Army that "no longer defends Yugoslavia, but rather represents it," to explain to civilians how that function essentially exceeds the constitutional position of the Army. In a certain sense, the two men share the destiny of leaders without a republic of their own: Suvar, who as a transnational collector of "minorities" within the divided nations is not nationally based; while the head of the Army stubbornly refuses to use the benefits of republican inside connections in the selection of key military figures. Thus, it can be said, with some amount of exaggeration, that the two Imotski natives, in seeking a base in the nonexistent federal territory, remind one of the presidents of folkloric societies who seek to preserve archaic customs.

However, although the explanation for Suvar's breakthrough from the ideological pulpit to the "political throne" is masked by his remarkable evolution, it is possible to say exactly why Kadijevic was promoted to the top military position. First of all, knowing that the suggestion of the "staff of generals" is considered in choosing the federal secretary for national defense, it was obviously their professional wish that this 63-year-old "half diplomat, half soldier" receive this most delicate position. Specifically, in view of the fact that these days even colonels not even 50 years old are promoted to the rank of general, Kadijevic almost certainly represents the last war veteran in the post of defense minister. This transition from the "wartime" to the "peacetime" generation is, as a rule, traumatic for an army anywhere. The issue is especially sensitive for our Army, bearing in mind the level of identification with the partisan generation. It is a question, first of all, of the responsibility that will be left up to a future military administration composed of theoreticians, not practitioners of war; the clearer the starting position, the fewer open problems (one can already see how questionable the unfeasible task is even for the military), because a future secretary, the chief of the General Staff and head of the Army, will lack the aura of participation in the revolution, while people who personally "underwent the baptism of fire" have to fight for their status in a struggle with a generation of politicians who are also not veterans and who, moreover, are not the least bit sentimental about their own days during the war. Or to be more precise, they are not sentimental towards anyone except when their own position is at stake.

Like it or not, even the Army is included in the process of creating national and supranational leaders, and of weighing out the situation through the results of mass support of their strategic platforms. In particular, Kadijevic is, conditionally speaking, the second post-Tito "military leader" in a row; the first was, coincidentally,

Admiral Mamula. Previous defense ministers (four of them came from Croatia: Tito, Gosnjak, Mamula, Kadijevic; one came from Serbia: Ljubcic) while Tito was alive maintained an inconspicuous public profile, remaining next to politics, never in it. According to the already-established tradition, defense ministers appeared before the Assembly once a year—where the military budget was approved after minimal debate—and once before the media on 22 December. Mamula was the first military leader to find himself in a situation of a serious shortage of resources, the first one to have to publicly discuss the results of the work of the party and state leadership, from the standpoint of the greater influx of "civilian" problems that were beginning to corrode the military mechanism: from nationalism and attempts at ethnic homogenization, to the creation of enemy cells within the units, and the massacre, as well as the drastic upset in the balance of nationalities, in the officer corps. In addition, Mamula was also the first military "labor-union" leader, who had to explain to his people that the days of large budgets were over, to pacify dissatisfaction in the middle ranks of the Army and among retired military personnel with their income and with the high rate of unemployment among their children. Because the soldiers, in constructing their own internal system, which makes it possible to create permanent military patriachs, set limits to the retirement age for active service, Mamula retired, at his own request, halfway through his second term in office. His departure elicited numerous comments and guesses about the resignation being the "result" of a clash between the military and civilian sectors and charges of actions by the Slovenian youth press. An indirect answer from the head of the Army has come recently in the form of a public expression of appreciation for Mamula in a statement by his successor: "Mamula has reason to be proud of his deeds."

Judging from all indications, Kadijevic is "a general of continuity," supported by the top military brass and a large part of the civilian leadership; his arrival ended the guesses and almost open announcements that the time had come for the head of whatever Secretariat for National Defense to be a civilian! However, military people do not readily accept "amateurs" as leaders; moreover, the very possibility that a civilian would be chosen signalled a mass race for the post and the nomination of all the candidates. It was interesting to ask the republics in question: What awaits us in the imminent future if the post of defense minister represents a leadership function for which there were several candidates? This situation definitively persuaded the military to make their "republican cadre" dependent on "republican platforms," and they have discretely let it be known how the previous decision was the most suitable one.

As has already been written about Kadijevic, he is the descendant of an old family from Glavina, near Imotski. He was born of a "Serbo-Croatian marriage"; his friends emphasize his fanatical Yugoslav orientation, in addition to his knowledge and superiority at all the military

schools at which he studied, his refinement and abilities as a competent conversationalist from "the university to the committee." To the public, he is known as the strategist (for the late Gen Viktor Bubnje) of the largest "Sloboda 71" maneuver (where we convincingly defeated "the Blues"). At the time, he was a well-known speaker and interpreter of the situation on the battlefield, and then, 5 years later, he planned and organized the military training for the half a million young people who went to the "summer war games" over the school holidays. As assistant secretary, he looked after military production, and at the suggestion of Milka Planinc, he was appointed deputy secretary in 1985, thus assuming part of the task of communication with political and social organs.

Although to amateur observers it may seem that Kadijevic is simply continuing the line begun by Mamula, the speed with which troubles arise in this country and his view of a possible resolution of problems is leaving, even after this short period of time, the identifiable mark of a "specific handwriting." Specifically, Kadijevic is plagued by the typically military problems: the structure of the armed forces (their size and composition), modernization (the introduction of new technologies), the level of readiness for action and the level of resistance (the ability to engage in long conflicts and to win them). All things considered, however, the main problem, besides the chronic shortage of funds, is the social situation which, paradoxically, is not resulting in a threat to the civilian system by military ambitions (which is what usually happens elsewhere in the world); on the contrary, the situation is putting the Army in a state of continuous internal tension through an undeclared gray war of limited intensity. The Army leadership can choose between two standard models for a possible position for the military: It can act as the classical "army in the barracks," thus, as a service shop, the muscles of internal policy, or it can act as the "ninth League of Communists" in the party and social system. Of course, its constitutional position is fixed exactly, but in our system practice prevails. The greatest fear felt by our military—if it is possible to speak in these terms—is that civilian stupidity will become so great that intervention by the armed forces will become unavoidable, in order to save the system. This change to an internal threat, instead of the traditional—still present today—foreign threat is forcing military leaders into more active connections, as they have already been forced into "consequences."

In contrast to his predecessor, Kadijevic was put into a situation that openly rejects the "requests" of some civilian lovers of military putsches, looking for the Army to arbitrate current disputes. Also, the fact that if this continues, the armed forces will actually be reduced to being a metaphor for Yugoslavia, does not square with the image of the "army in the barracks." Instead of the traditional restraint practiced by generals in public appearances, Kadijevic openly states that "the Army has well-defined and clear positions on all open questions."

In all recent texts, the minister expresses his support for a modern market economy (as it exists in the Mikulic cabinet), for a unified economic region, for a Yugoslavia that is "neither confederal nor unitaristic," for a League of Communists that is capable of "putting itself at the forefront of social change," for a final settlement of the Kosovo issue and for the top echelons of the party and social leadership, which actually makes decisions because, in his opinion, "a situation without decisions is the worst possible situation. It leads everyone to ruin." For example, Kadijevic thinks that the attacks on the Yugoslav People's Army are "a function of destroying the federal state," revealing the existence of pressure from the republics on the system of command using armed forces, and talks about attempts to link officers to "republican and provincial plans even when these plans are not at the same time Yugoslav plans." As Kadijevic himself sees it, this type of situation "diverts soldiers from their true job," adding that attacks on the Army, in contrast to those in the past, which were carried out by "authentic enemies," now have support "from some legal institutions," or even come right from them.

In any case, it will not be easy for Kadijevic. Judging by worldwide trends, a drop in military industry exports can be expected; there is no money to import new technologies; there are new riddles to be solved every day: what the new initiatives to demystify "military small fry" mean, and what "the attempt to dismantle the Army" is; how to maintain the "neutrality of the armed forces" amid bitter attacks and bitter encroachment; how to resolve objections about the "excessively Serbian nature" of the Army and alleged "anti-Slovenian" sentiment; how to change the entire design, from the uniform to the iconography, in order to make the military profession more attractive; how to view generals who remain in politics and who get involved in bitter clashes with each other; how to "release pressure" from internal, dissatisfied strata of the army via controlled outlets; what position to take on homogenization and "mass politics," in all its variations; how and where to introduce the Slovenian and Macedonian languages in training and inscriptions on military equipment; how to resolve the ethnic segregation of soldiers during their free time, if this is regarded as a problem...

In contrast to the previous military administration, which "had an opinion about everything, but did not advertise it," Kadijevic represents the model for a new approach to current problems by the army leadership. It is not only true that he has an opinion about everything; he also talks about it on every occasion. In the current judgment in Slovenia and some Albanian groups, the new team heading the Army apparently understands on the one hand those factors that determine "how far one can go with the Army," and on the other hand those advantages such as evidence of the "dogmatic structure" of the military system, which will "ultimately be affected" by the process of democratization.

First of all, however, it is known that the organism's daily requirement of iron is better satisfied by spinach

than by tanks, and secondly, rousing every morning as the defense minister, Kadijevic knows that 220,000 soldiers are waiting for both servings.

Remzi Kolgeci Interviewed on Kosovo Issues
28000059a Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
20 Dec 88 pp 10-13

[Interview with Remzi Kolgeci, chairman of the State Presidency of Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and acting chairman of the Kosovo League of Communists Provincial Committee, by Jelena Lovric: "Assessments Lightly Offered"; date and place not given]

[Text] He seemed quite harmless when at the very end of the last meeting of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Central Committee (LCY CC) Remzi Kolgeci, who is at the moment the first man in the legal Kosovo leadership, came to the rostrum and said in an altogether calm voice that in his opinion the assessments and positions of the Presidium of the LCY CC on the recent rallies of citizens of Albanian nationality do not reflect as a whole the nature of events in that province. He therefore proposed that this be debated at length in the next meeting of the CC, which in no case means, he mentioned, relieving the provincial leadership of responsibility for vigorous performance of the agreed tasks.

It was as though this were some altogether incidental remark, not actually one of the key moments of the meeting when its even course could easily have turned into an eruption of disagreement such as has occurred before and possibly will ensue hereafter. In order to ensure the peaceful character of the last meeting, the central party leadership safeguarded it from all the incendiary topics which had been promised, for example, determining the accountability of Azem Vllasi and the "comrades" pursuant to the demands of the LCY CC. It might have been believed that this was done from a desire not to encumber in any way the debate of the economic reform which was on the agenda if the assessments and views of the presidium on the Albanian rallies had not been made public that morning. No situation can be recalled when during the session of the supreme party forum its political executive body made public its views as though this was of no concern at all to the CC. Stipe Suvar would later say that the top party leadership adopted those views in the early morning hours of Monday, that they were not voted on, but were drafted in a collective effort, that probably no one was individually satisfied with any of the wordings offered, but that everything was the result of a necessary compromise. Remarking that the problems could not be passed on from meeting to meeting, Bogdan Trifunovic did nothing to signify his satisfaction with the recent document of the Presidium of the LCY CC, when he said that the essential thing was not how the presidium had arrived at it, but that it had adopted it and thus set forth new political positions. Nor is this any wonder, since the assessment of the Albanian developments made by the

top leadership of the party of Yugoslavia is much closer to that given by the Serbian leadership than the one given preliminary adoption by the provincial leadership.

Instead of it being third time pays for all, the Presidium of the LCY CC judged last week that "the deeper and more far-reaching objectives of those who organized and inspired the rallies and demonstrations were to prevent performance of the tasks set by the 17th Meeting of the LCY Federal Conference concerning accountability of the leadership of the Kosovo CC and concerning constitutional amendments in SR Serbia, blocking the effort to implement the policy of the LCY concerning Kosovo and to stabilize social and political conditions in the province, which objectively represents further pressure for Serbs and Montenegrins to move out, for creation of an ethnically pure Kosovo, and for achievement of the goal 'Kosovo a Republic,' which is counterrevolutionary and is directed against the constitutional order of SR Serbia and the SFRY." The provincial leadership was given bad marks because of its opportunism, its defensiveness, and its evasion of implementation of the resolutions adopted at higher levels, as well as because of its division along ethnic lines, which, should it continue, would actually place the League of Communists in danger of ceasing to exist as a unified organization. The insufficient commitment of the structures and leaderships in Kosovo has had the effect, it stated, of serious misinformation concerning the essence and scope of the constitutional amendments and insertion of the arguments of Albanian separatist nationalism concerning infringement of the rights of the Albanian nationality, and the spreading of rumors about abolishing the right to equal use of language. To be sure, it is acknowledged that demands from the ranks of Serbian and Montenegrin nationalists to abolish autonomy in Kosovo, to dissolve the bodies of government there, which evoked revolt and fear in a large number of members of the Albanian nationality and stimulated their resistance to the constitutional amendments, also contributed to the deterioration of the political situation related to the constitutional amendments. But the Serbian leadership was given favorable marks for its "aid to the provincial leadership," and it also "committed itself fully" at the federal level.

The question is how after such assessments, which objectively add to the lack of confidence in the Albanians and which call for accountability solely on the part of the provincial leadership, are any of the fundamental constructive commitments contained in those views to be achieved, for example, initiation of the broadest political action among party members, among the workers and in the people, above all those belonging to the Albanian nationality, to create a united socialist front of Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins, and members of all other nationalities and ethnic minorities in Kosovo? In Kosovo, the word is that a situation should be feared when it can evoke such lightly made assessments and unbalanced accountability, that as soon as they were learned about, it immediately became almost impossible

to talk to activists, and that all of this can only repel the Albanians. Yet still we should wait to see the real dimensions of the possible consequences. For Remzi Kolgeci, who calmly gave notice of them, the consequences were quick to come and not gentle in the least. A day or 2 after the meeting, following the established method, the newspapers were already declaring him a wanted man. And even without that it probably is not at all comfortable to be in his shoes today. When we talked to him a few days ago in Pristina, he said that he would not wish it on anyone else. The burden that has been thrust onto the back of this unusually up-to-date Albanian politician (time and again he has been first in various places, and at the age of 25 he was the president of an opstina, the youngest in Yugoslavia) at the age of 42 includes not one but two red-hot Kosovo positions, that of chairman of the provincial presidency and acting chairman of the provincial committee. We asked him at the very outset why he had called for the assessments of the presidium and three differing truths to be put on the agenda of the CC?

Kolgeci: Because I thought that it should be above all the CC that should discuss these recent events in Kosovo and evaluate the situation. Second, it is my opinion that certain passages in the assessments adopted might be different. Third, I do not understand why there was such great insistence on their adoption, when we in the provincial committee, together with representatives of the highest bodies of the League of Communists agreed that we would work jointly on the analyses and assessments of the Kosovo events. It is pursuant to that agreement and reconciliation of views that we have not so far presented a complete assessment, but only a report and preliminary views. But that agreed joint effort has not come about.

DANAS: And now you feel betrayed?

Kolgeci: In a way, yes. But more than that, it makes one wonder why the agreement was not respected. There is no answer to that question. I assume I know, but at present I am not certain. So, I am afraid that if that is to be the way we operate, we will not be able to resolve the Kosovo problems much more rapidly in the future either.

DANAS: What passages in the assessments were you thinking of when you said that you did not agree with them?

Kolgeci: One of the most essential is the one about the far-reaching objectives of those who went out into the streets. I think that the analysis yet has to be made as to what their ulterior political intentions were. Was this resistance to the constitutional amendments or—what I think is closer to the truth—was this resistance to the efforts to change the principles of the 1974 Constitution, which contained a guarantee for the Albanian nationality and guaranteed equality in Yugoslavia? After all, we have completed the public debate of the constitutional

amendments, and it follows from an analysis of that debate that on the whole the inhabitants of Kosovo are in favor of the constitutional amendments, but they are not in favor of those which could threaten certain vital rights of the province as a sociopolitical community. We on the provincial committee have agreed to make more embracing analyses of everything that happened during those stormy days in Kosovo, and this would be done in the context of overall social circumstances. But I think at this moment the emphasis needs to be placed more on motives, and only afterwards on the question of how those large rallies were organized. The assessments should be based on the known facts, not on certain assumed ulterior motives of some of the participants in the meetings. For example, were our socialist insignia, the flags, and the pictures of Tito an expression of people's commitment, or, was all of that just camouflage, as some people assume and even in a way prejudice the case?

DANAS: What in your opinion were the real motives?

Kolgeci: What happened during those few days last month can never be examined separately from the context of the times and the social and political circumstances in recent years and particularly in recent months. When under the pressure of the crisis, which has become acute, and the social contradictions the broad masses emerge onto the political scene with determination, even Kosovo could not remain free of such trials and tribulations. I am not trying to say that there is a certain symmetry between the Albanian rallies and the rallies of Serbs and Montenegrins organized because of dissatisfaction with the overall situation in Kosovo, but in those meetings there were also slogans, arguments, and proposals unacceptable to the League of Communists. We cannot adapt our assessments every time according to which nationality or ethnic minority has taken to the streets. It might be said that any gathering on an ethnic basis is unacceptable, and this is especially pernicious in Kosovo, since every such gathering in a way takes on the significance of pressure on the other side. We have always called attention to that, and as the League of Communists of Kosovo we have had clear positions on that question. But when a gathering does occur, all people cannot be put in the same basket, and they cannot all be proclaimed nationalists or destructive elements. A fine line, then, has to be drawn to distinguish between what in some way represents a desire for further development of the socialist community from the desire to destroy that community. Demands for brotherhood and unity, for equality, commitment to Tito's strategy and to Tito's Yugoslavia were dominant at these recent gatherings, at least what was in public view. I am the first one to say that all events in Kosovo should be analyzed from every angle, but not outside the overall context of Yugoslav society. We cannot fail to see that everything that has happened in Kosovo and outside it since last summer has had the effect of creating some kind of mood in the Albanian masses. It might be said that many things are a reflex and a response to the anti-Albanian

disposition which has for years been expressed in a portion of the press, journalism, and certain institutions, but particularly in the monoethnic gatherings during the summer. But such responses are unacceptable. We cannot relativize them because of the supposed pronounced need to remove the complex of collective responsibility for the counterrevolution which the revanchist forces have imposed. If we allow such showdowns and such ways of putting the ball back in our court, then all we have done is to contribute to a further deepening of the confrontations and indeed even to the open conflict between nationalities.

DANAS: Probably you also have an insight into this organized spontaneity—perhaps that is the best term for it—of the Albanian rallies? The question heard most frequently is who organized them?

Kolgeci: If we knew the motives, then I think it would all be clear to us. But it would be a mistake at this point to assert that there was no organization. But then it is hard to say how much organization there was and how much spontaneity, nor is that the most essential thing. At least the facts we know so far show that it was not organized by the enemy. Who it was is not altogether clear to the security authorities, nor to the politicians.

DANAS: It is being insinuated that the leadership here, or at least certain individuals within it, wanted to show in some way that they also have their people behind them. This applies above all to Vllasi.

Kolgeci: I think that he did not issue an appeal exclusively to the Albanian nationality, but rather, like all party people in Kosovo when they talk about their constituency, he probably was thinking of all the nationalities and ethnic minorities here, which, of course, necessarily would include the Albanian nationality, since it is a part of the constituency. We have never said that we represent only one nationality, at least we have not done that up to now. And if it is thought that someone in the provincial leadership is behaving in such a manner, then that has to be documented, rather than just inventing things or saying things without proof.

DANAS: You probably did not speak in that manner, but in the end even the leadership was sharply divided along ethnic lines.

Kolgeci: That is true, but that was not the result of just this present moment and recent events. What are all the things that have favored a division along ethnic lines in the leadership—has it been only the gatherings of Albanians or also the gatherings of Serbs and Montenegrins, hasn't it been overall social developments not only in Kosovo, but also in Serbia and Yugoslavia that helped to bring that about? I think that the disunity at the top levels of the party, which is not of very recent date, has tended to favor divisions in Kosovo, just as the deep contradictions here and the immense problems have also contributed. Divisions in the leadership along ethnic

lines are a Kosovo reality, but their origins are not to be found here alone. Over a lengthy period of time, but especially in recent months, there have been differences between the political leadership of Kosovo and that in Serbia over a number of issues that have vital importance to political life in the province and in the republic. Out in public, there have been disagreements, polemical exchanges, calls for accountability, all the way to open confrontations. The provincial leadership has often spent a great deal of energy denying assessments which quite often were meant to be an imposition. Often action degenerated into arguments with the newspapers, into efforts to prove that the situation in Kosovo is not as dark as they are writing. However, now we have arrived at a point where no one any longer needs to assure anyone how serious the situation is in Kosovo.

DANAS: Could that energy which motivated the Albanians to gather have been used for constructive purposes?

Kolgeci: I think that it could. And now that we are speaking about constructive energy, then we must note with regret that we did not have our ears open wide enough to follow what was happening with the Albanians in Kosovo. Whether we want to admit it or not, for the past few months we have been completely preoccupied with the protests and rallies of Serbs and Montenegrins, we have been engaged solely on those problems. Another big question is the extent to which we have resolved them. Another question is how much we could have done to solve them anyway. But it is a fact that since the Ninth Meeting of the LCY CC on Kosovo last summer we have not concerned ourselves in any detail with what has happened among the Albanians. I am deeply convinced that this is one of the reasons why these recent gatherings occurred. Just as I am convinced that this constructive energy which still exists in segments of the Albanian nationality could and should have been channeled differently. The League of Communists as a whole, the activists, what we refer to as the subjective factor, utterly failed us here. What happened, after all, was not an expression of a momentary situation, but rather the problems and the events, not only in Kosovo, but also toward Kosovo, had been building up a deposit for some time.

DANAS: One of the participants in the Albanian gatherings said that it was high time to stop insulting a nationality.

Kolgeci: We have been witnesses that this has occurred, and there has been quite a bit of it, and that is another thing that demands a detailed response from us. Following the attempted counterrevolution in 1981, the anti-Albanian forces have gradually come onto the scene and have begun to retrieve the mortgages of the Albanians from the dark past and bring them up-to-date. The pressure from the separatists has produced a strong counterpressure in which the line of demarcation between Albanian nationalism and the entire Albanian

nationality was frequently overlooked. Nor should that be any wonder: unscrupulous campaigns and pressures are not mindful either of individuals or of entire nationalities. Thus, recently we have frequently heard statements about "fascistoid genocide in Kosovo," phrases are mentioned such as "honest Albanians" or "Albanians with a Yugoslav orientation," which suggest the conclusion that they are very few in number, that such people are actually exceptions. I think that that is not permissible, among other things because the Albanian nationality has proven its adherence to Yugoslavia on several occasions. There are rotten apples in every nationality, but the entire nationality cannot be described and called a name on the basis of individuals.

DANAS: Does that mean that the leadership was surprised by the recent gatherings?

Kolgeci: When our ears were not open wide enough to everything that was happening among the Albanians, then it is certain that we were surprised.

DANAS: But at the time when the Vojvodina leadership was brought down, when there were assessments to the effect that the same procedure would be followed in Kosovo, there were those who said that in that case there would be a mass movement of Albanians. Warnings of that kind are said then to have turned the danger of a putsch from Kosovo to Montenegro.

Kolgeci: There were those who argued that if something like what had occurred in Vojvodina were attempted here, it would not go so smoothly as it did there. We merely called attention to the fact that in Kosovo it would not be a good thing to bring down the leadership with monoethnic rallies. And this has unfortunately proven to be true.

DANAS: They say that you deserve credit for preventing repression from being used in certain cases during those rallies.

Kolgeci: Part of the credit. I think that our overall commitment was the right one. We attempted to calm down the situation with political measures, and I am convinced that we were rather successful in doing so. The question is what would have happened if force had been used? Certainly, it would have had serious consequences to public order, peace, and security, but it also would have had adverse repercussions on the desire of the Albanian nationality and its ability to become politically involved in overcoming Kosovo's problems.

DANAS: As the top man in the Kosovo leadership, you were very much involved and always in the front ranks during those days. What were the dilemmas you faced? As a leader, but also as an individual?

Kolgeci: First, did I act intelligently when I made the decisions, especially when measures had to be adopted which, if violated, would have resulted in the use of

repression? Second, was it necessary that all this occur? I am convinced that it was not necessary, we should have had our ears open wider so as to channel this energy of the masses in some other way. Third, I will always see in front of my eyes, certainly so long as I live, the picture of those soaked and frozen children—what was it that moved them to march in columns—and the persistence of those who started for Pristina on foot in the bad weather. I certainly will never forget the meeting on the highway with the miners from Stari Trg when I tried to persuade them to go back, and their subsequent proper behavior, which gave me hope that these rallies could not be turned into something that could be called hostile.

DANAS: The motive of social dissatisfaction has been operating strongly in certain other gatherings in recent months as well. No one is talking about that kind of revolt in Kosovo even though the economic situation is very serious.

Kolgeci: Do you think that there are no social welfare problems in Kosovo? There were social rebellions of that kind both last year and this year, and I am convinced that there will be many more of them in the future. Because the economic reform, which is the only way out of the socioeconomic crisis and whose principles we stand on firmly, is going to hurt the underdeveloped parts of the country the most. That is why I expect that there will be extensive social unrest in Kosovo.

DANAS: What is the relationship between the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins or better interethnic relations with economic success or failure?

Kolgeci: One of the causes of the exodus has certainly been the overall economic situation. Right now, political reasons are somewhat more important, but we cannot neglect the fact that economic developments have been affecting the exodus. When I say this, I am thinking above all that Kosovo now has about 135,000 unemployed with a labor force in the socialized sector of about 220,000. Within that number, there are about 15,000 to 20,000 Serbs and Montenegrins.

DANAS: You say that the first task now is to improve interethnic relations, which means creating a climate of mutual trust. This is constantly being said, has been for years now, but still the situation has been getting worse and worse.

Kolgeci: Reason must win out, since it is the destiny of people here to live together. There is no other way out.

DANAS: But how do you think to achieve it? By political action?

Kolgeci: First of all through political action, through greater commitment by members of the League of Communists, through more vigorous work in the Socialist Alliance, with young people. If we stop exchanging shots at the leadership level, that will help to calm down the

overall situation. And perhaps most important, if all the obstacles are overcome that stand in the way of enacting the constitutional amendments in Serbia and in Kosovo, that will also help in a way to improve interethnic relations.

DANAS: It turns out that this is rather easily resolved, but still the opinion is rather widespread in the Yugoslav republic that the traces of what has been happening now in Kosovo cannot be erased for years, that it will take the wounds decades to heal.

Kolgeci: Yes, it is easy to speak, and I agree that it will not be easy to work out. But first we have to see whether there is goodwill. I think that it exists both with the Serbs and Montenegrins and also with the Albanians and the others in Kosovo.

DANAS: But is that enough? Last summer, when the former Kosovo leadership was being called to account, you said that that had come very late.

Kolgeci: When we stated in the Platform on Kosovo that everything that happened in '81 resulted from the erroneously conducted policy before that, then it is natural that responsibility should be placed. That is why I said that the responsibility of the leaders at that time had been established 7 years late. Is that the result of opportunism in the League of Communists of Kosovo or a consequence of our overall circumstances? Probably a bit of both, but this tended to slow down the political-ideological differentiation, since neither the Kosovo public nor the Yugoslav public were able to understand that those who bore the greatest responsibility were being spared, when steps were being taken against others.

DANAS: It seems to me that there is another debt in Kosovo, the debt of the silence of Albanians concerning what is happening to the Serbs and Montenegrins?

Kolgeci: That again cannot be answered until one first discovers the overall causes of the Kosovo events. But I am not justifying the long silence concerning everything that has been uncivilized, concerning those things that can be called threats to human rights as a whole, in Kosovo and in the country, concerning insults to human dignity, concerning equality. But I could not agree that the Albanian nationality has been silent. I would rather say that we have not been organized to use that energy in the people in the way that would have been the most progressive not only for a nationality, but for everyone, both in Kosovo and in the country. But unfortunately that would apply not only to Kosovo, but to Yugoslavia as a whole.

DANAS: That is true, but one of the things that the rallies demonstrate is that people can after all be set in motion. To be sure, that is much easier when they themselves believe that their rights have been infringed, when they themselves are frightened rather than when others need to be protected. Viewed from outside, it

seems that in Kosovo today it is not easy to be a Serb, but today it is no longer easy to be an Albanian either. I have heard the figure that about 500,000 people have been processed by the police in one way or another....

Kolgeci: Five hundred thousand? I am not aware of that figure. That would mean one out of every three. That is an immense number....

DANAS: A terrible number. But regardless of the number, it is well-known that a large number of Albanians have received various penalties, that there are many young people in prison, which would have negative repercussions in any community, and in a patriarchal community it inevitably has still broader dimensions. Slobodan Milosevic recently said that those children should be released from prison. And certain scholars said even earlier that that ought to be a precondition for opening up dialogue with the Albanians.

Kolgeci: I am rather in favor of analyzing what we have done up to now, not only our political practice, but also sociological practice and every other aspect of our practice, in order to see whether we have achieved any results with that punishment. Certain figures indicate that we have not managed to socialize those people. The figures also indicate that not the slightest work is done with those people who have served certain prison sentences, that there is no program for them when they are released. Yet these are young people who have to live in this community.

DANAS: It seems to me that there is no end to the questions in Kosovo, and there are many fewer answers.

Kolgeci: Unfortunately, that is the way I see Kosovo today. Even if we attempted to analyze it, we would be dealing only with the consequences, not with the overall causes.

DANAS: Why has the entire action in Kosovo recently been reduced only to changes in personnel? To be sure, the view is being imposed from outside that this is a "key condition for everything else" (as Zoran Sokolovic put it), but the way in which these changes are being made suggests the conclusion that the reasons involved have not always had to do with principle.

Kolgeci: When the change of generations occurred 2 years ago, we had the impression that we would not be looking for a new leadership every few months, that we had achieved stability in personnel, especially since the new people were younger and I would say more able, people devoted to this Yugoslavia. But time and circumstances have not been in our favor. Problems have cropped up so quickly, lightning fast, that in some situations, being a young leadership, we have not been able to get our bearings. At times—I will be frank—we have also found ourselves isolated. At some times we have been more hindered than helped. More precise answers to the question of why we have found ourselves

in this situation would come from a deeper political analysis of everything that has happened in Kosovo and more widely this year and last. And the question of whether the Kosovo leadership is to blame for everything. It is certain that the greatest load falls on us, but still we are not alone.

DANAS: When will the changes in the Kosovo leadership end?

Kolgeci: That is a difficult question. The end will come when we stabilize the overall situation in Kosovo.

DANAS: That might be called an evasive answer.

Kolgeci: Why? I think that that is exactly the way it is. If I remain in my office in the party, I will perhaps leave in 5 or 6 months, since I have no illusion that conditions in Kosovo will be straightened out to any essential extent in the meantime. If the entire complicated set of Kosovo problems is evaluated solely in terms of an individual's ability to change it, then it is clear that no one can stay.

DANAS: In what way should Yugoslavia be present in Kosovo so that—pursuing Suvar's well-known argument—it does not become Kosovo itself?

Kolgeci: I think that more people in the leadership should visit Kosovo and stay longer so that they see the whole truth. I do not think much of 1-day visits, and unfortunately we have had quite a bit of that up to now. Nor do I think much of studying Kosovo's problems exclusively from a desk somewhere. You have to go among the people. It is an important truth that we have not been present in a segment of the Albanian nationality as the leadership of Kosovo, but we have not been there either as activists of the CC of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Together we have not been well-organized to use the mood of the people for what we refer to as stabilization of Kosovo.

DANAS: Are there nevertheless reasons for any kind of encouragement?

Kolgeci: We have been witnesses to a situation in which certain destructive forces have wanted to aggressively impose arguments about the historical right of this or that nationality to Kosovo. Some people perceive Kosovo more as a myth than as a reality. In these mythomaniacal conflicts, the Illyrian myth will be dominant one moment and the medieval myth the next. But in civilized societies today, both in the world at large and also in socialist Yugoslavia, nationalities are not classified according to historical rights, but according to democratic rights. It must be clear to everyone that Kosovo is neither Serbian nor Albanian, but belongs to all who live here. Those who love Kosovo can love it only as a community of Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks, Muslims, Croats, Gypsies, and all the others for whom this is home. The slogan which we heard separately in rallies of members of both nationalities, "We

will give up our lives, we will not give up Kosovo," makes sense only if it is shouted jointly by Serbs and Albanians and if Kosovo is understood to be a community of fraternal and equal nationalities and ethnic minorities, that is, if the slogan applies to Tito's socialist and self-managed Kosovo. Aside from the protests, the Albanian masses expressed in their meetings unreserved support for Tito's strategy, and that is the most constructive thing that was evident in those rallies. At the same time, pictures of Tito were also carried in rallies of Serbs and Montenegrins during the summer, and trust in what he did was also expressed. In this difficult situation of ours, only Tito's strategy offers a way out. Instead of polemics and squabbles, we should build programs for development to which all the nationalities and ethnic minorities will bind themselves. Instead of charges and calls for responsibility, we should be offering a hand of assistance and mutual trust. Instead of confrontation—a common front.

Better Representation of Kosovo in Diplomatic Corps Urged

21000008 Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian
12 Dec 88 p 5

[Article by M. Studenica: "A Lag Revealed"]

[Text] From 1980 up to this year, although 50 individuals have been recommended for work in diplomatic missions, only one Kosovar has "become a diplomat." Out of 1,170 workers in the SFPJ [Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs], 37 individuals—or 3.4 percent—are from the province, while in diplomatic and consular missions, there are only 50 Kosovars employed out of 1,150 people (4 percent). What should be done to improve the representation of Kosovar cadres in this field?

It goes without saying that diplomacy is both an esteemed and an interesting profession. Its tradition of many years has contributed to its being perfected today throughout the world. Our country now has a tradition of fine quality in the area of diplomacy, and good steps in this field have also been made by the KSA [Autonomous Socialist Province] of Kosovo. There has been good representation by its cadres in this field in past years, but since 1980 involvement of cadres in the area of diplomacy has been lagging. Is there a mistrust of cadres or a lack of Kosovar cadres trained to exercise this duty? Since 1980, and until this year, out of 50 cadres recommended by Kosovo for the diplomatic service, only one person has been entrusted with this work, while the others have received a document stating that "they do not fulfill the conditions for work in the SFPJ."

Only 37 individuals (4 percent) are Kosovars employed by the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs [SFPJ]. In diplomatic and consular missions from our country throughout the world, there are only 50 people from Kosovo, or 4 percent. Five are ambassadors: to Spain, Holland, Switzerland, Gabon, and Thailand. There are

no Kosovars in any organization or section of the United Nations, while 57 people from our country are members of many United Nations organizations and sections, as well as of other international organizations.

The situation is somewhat better in economic missions throughout the world. Out of 63 representatives of the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce around the world, 4 individuals are from Kosovo: in Sofia, in Tripoli, in Bombay, and in Paris. But it must be emphasized that thanks to high-quality cooperation with the world in the economic field on the part of "Trepca" and "EXIMKOS," the trade network around the world has made conspicuous progress: aside from the firm "Kosovo Export-Import GmbH" in Munich, missions have now been opened in Moscow, Berlin (GDR), Tirana, Bucharest, Prague, Istanbul, Warsaw, and Vienna. In addition to these joint missions of "EXIMKOS" and "Trepca-Komerc," BANKOSI has its own representation in Frankfurt, Zurich, and New York.

With regard to the lack of appropriate representation of the Province in diplomatic and consular missions, the Province itself is primarily to blame, since, as was said, it has pursued a mistaken policy in recommending cadres for the diplomatic service. Aside from this, the prerequisites for acceptance into the diplomatic corps are extremely rigorous: cadres must not be more than 54 years old, they must know a foreign language as well as a student who has completed seven semesters in the faculty of foreign languages. And when, in addition, there are also "moral and political" prerequisites, as well as others, required for the exercise of this profession, then one can imagine why so few people receive the title of diplomat.

Nevertheless, the Province has a great many young, educated cadres who could work in the diplomatic service, as has been said, among others, by Branko Vuksic, ambassador for cadre matters at the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, at a recent meeting of the Assembly Council of the KSA of Kosovo for Relations with the World. But it is absolutely necessary to socialize and democratize further the matter of competition of cadres for the diplomatic service. Young diplomats must be selected through public competitive examinations, and it is necessary to discard the practice that has existed until now of selecting cadres at narrow forums. Perhaps this will permit more Kosovars to fulfill the required conditions for work in this sought-after profession.

Aside from this, however, a more qualitative reorganization is needed for preliminary training and the recommendation of Kosovar cadres for the diplomatic service. On the other hand, the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs must devote more attention to the adequate representation of Kosovar cadres, and must have more understanding of and greater trust in them, avoiding possible preconceptions which may exist. In any case, this will permit the future employment of more diplomatic cadres from the Province in the missions of our

country, and this is, understandably, in the interests of our society, since it is known that throughout the world now there are more than 60,000 workers from the Province on temporary assignment, aside from those in Western Europe, while their temporary economic emigration is being intensified in other countries as well.

Pavlovic Book Criticizing Serbian Party Operations Reviewed

28000059b Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
20 Dec 88 pp 44-45

[Article by Zeljko Kruselj: "The Mechanism of a Frameup: How Dragisa Pavlovic Found Himself in the Gallery of Political Renegades"]

[Text] The Eighth Meeting of the Serbian League of Communists Central Committee also signified the "political death" of Dragisa Pavlovic, president of the Belgrade party organization. The parting of the ways with this "promising lad" did not take place in a manner that was in the least dignified since in the subsequent debate in the Belgrade City Committee of the League of Communists (LC) concerning publication of the satire "Vojko and Savle" he was even proclaimed a "moral monstrosity," and he was expelled from membership in the LC. That is how he came to be in the gallery of political renegades.

Recently, however, Pavlovic has shown that he is still kicking, that he has not even the slightest intention of accepting the scenario in which he is assigned the role of "traitor to the Serbian people." He has made a detailed case for his view of that stormy autumn of 1987 in Belgrade in his book "Olako obecana brzina" [The Easy Promise of Speed], published by Globus in Zagreb, whose title contains the phrase for which he was called to account and was dethroned a few days later. Aside from certain previously unknown details which the book presents concerning this entire case, Pavlovic has also taken pains to justify his view of the broader political context of the conflict with his opponents. The book is not confined, then, to spicy remarks related to the eighth meeting, but is actually an essay on political controversies and about the present moment in Serbia and Yugoslavia. It is indicative that Pavlovic does not complain of his own fate, nor indeed does he even display an excessive emotional bias against his opponents. On the contrary, Pavlovic is ironic about himself, and indeed has conceived the entire book after the model of Cervantes' "Don Quixote." The only difference is that the "phantom" which the self-styled "naive hero" obstinately fights is not "windmills," but "Serbian nationalism." At the same time, it has been easy for Pavlovic to find "hollow" places, since the affair concerning the real author of the satire "Vojko and Savle" still remains entirely unclarified, his "mentor" relations with Ivan Stambolic have remained in the shadow, as have his

"whispers out loud" concerning a countercoup to displace Slobodan Milosevic. But if the "other side" continues to be silent, at least as far as the public is concerned, about certain of these matters, it is logical that Pavlovic would not want to bring it up unnecessarily either.

Pavlovic's book should be read first of all as a criticism of the functioning of the party apparatus in Serbia, although no great amount of wisdom is needed to conclude that many of those "deliberate deviations" have also been present in all the other republic and provincial organizations. Indeed, the author exposes even the broadest mechanism of power and also the methods whereby it is consolidated and tailored to the interests of smaller groups. It is from that angle that Pavlovic has added to what we learn from Dragoslav "Draza" Markovic in his memoirs "Zivot i politika" [Life and Politics], who had seemed unattainable in that regard. For the sake of comparison, whereas in Draza's time personnel policy was tailored both vertically and horizontally at Zika Car's, in recent years that role has been taken over by various coordinating committees, closed meetings, and manipulations through the media. To those who are not in the know, then, it seems that now a much broader group of people are taking part in the formulation of policy and selection of personnel, but that this, as Pavlovic interprets it, remains even now "under the strict control" of the new-style leaders. The present situation is all the more dangerous because the mass media have inevitably been covering the "political performances," and so the politicization of the masses has reached unprecedented proportions. In that context, Pavlovic's insistence on a policy of "sober heads" and "a stifling of passion" are actually a kind of anachronism.

An Easy Phrase

Transferred to the specific events within the Serbian LC Central Committee (CC), Pavlovic asserts that a majority of the meetings of its presidium were closed and that objective information could almost never be obtained concerning the content of those debates. At several places, Pavlovic offers one and the same wording concerning this significant problem, and this is at the same time his commentary on the event: "No report was made in the meeting, but rather the members of the Presidium of the Serbian LC CC read it the next day in POLITIKA." The author of "Olako obecana brzina" also explains how POLITIKA was gradually radicalized for this purpose as the most influential daily newspaper in Belgrade, how infuriated Serbian nationalism was "fed" by the Kosovo drama and the crime in the Paracin Garrison and how the question of "whether Serbia was sitting on POLITIKA as a pillar or a charge of dynamite" was becoming increasingly definite. In attempting to answer this dilemma in specific terms, Pavlovic used the "easy" phrase we have referred to in a conversation with journalists, thereby reserving himself a "summons" to the eighth meeting.

As for relations in the Belgrade LC City Committee, the body for whose performance he was directly responsible, Pavlovic believes that a "nucleus" whose main objective was to remove him from office was formed early on. This, he says, was the "university group" (Rados Smiljkovic, Jagos Puric, Stipe Lovreta, Snezana Aleksic, Nebojsa Maljkovic, and Zoran Todorovic), which was a kind of "salient" for Milosevic's policy in the city committee. Pavlovic refers to them, and they were backed up by Dusan Mitevic and Slobodanka Gruden, as the "dogmatists," since their vision of political reality and also of the functioning of the League of Communists was completely contrary to his.

The first step in the break that was to come was suspension of regular communications between the city committee and the university committee, so that Pavlovic was deprived of an insight into the "planned scandal" concerning the alleged insulting of Tito in the newspaper *STUDENT*.

Since just a week or 2 before that same newspaper had been spoken of as a candidate even for a republic commendation, Pavlovic said that at first he thought that this was a misunderstanding in reading to whom the "vampire's teeth" on the front page were to be attributed, and indeed even a case of injured vanity of individuals who were referred to in certain articles as protagonists of dogmatic concepts. While the affair was still at its height, and he was continuing to issue appeals for reason, he realized that actually this was the prelude to the planned "Pavlovic case." So if, then, *STUDENT* was the formal cause of initiating proceedings as to the accountability of the chairman of the Belgrade City Committee of the LC, then the talk which journalists referred to about the "easy promise of speed" was the proximate cause. To put it succinctly, the verdict was pronounced even before Pavlovic had even fully realized what the charges in the indictment were.

In the closed meeting of the Presidium of the Serbian LC CC held a few days before the eighth meeting, a very effective media event, what is usually referred to as the "mechanism of the political game" came into full play. Without warning, Pavlovic was proclaimed guilty of attacks on the person and accomplishments of Josip Broz Tito (or the "appearance of the Devil at the university," as he himself ironically referred to it), for failure to implement the policy of the Serbian LC and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) that had been outlined concerning Kosovo, and also for inappropriate procedures of the city committee. The essential thing, however, was that certain nonmembers of that forum were also invited to that meeting, and it is they (for example, Zika Minovic and Ratimir Vico) who were the main "witnesses" supporting the charge. Moreover, during that meeting the "letter of five members of the presidium of the city committee," which had been completely unknown to the public and was a kind of counterpoint to the letter of Ivan Stambolic, containing an explanation that this form of address to the republic

party leadership was an "expression of lack of confidence in the people making up the leadership of the city's League of Communists," was read out during that meeting.

Bargaining With Votes

Fifteen members of the presidium voted for proceedings to assess the political accountability of Dragisa Pavlovic, and 4 were against. When the eighth meeting was opened, then, there were no unknowns. What millions of Yugoslavs saw on their television screens, Pavlovic says, was only a "performance which had to be performed to the end." But even here nothing was left to chance. In its report from the presidium, *POLITIKA* had already prejudiced the outcome, the members of the Central Committee read the transcript from the closed meeting, and again at least one-third more people participated than the number of members in the supreme party body in Serbia. Nevertheless, perhaps the key thing was that the vote was public. And such a method, Pavlovic warns, affords the individual the possibility of "bargaining with his vote," and it does nothing to prevent "coercion, threats, or blackmail," and it represents a striking form of "personal candidacy."

The meeting of the Belgrade City Committee of the LC in which Pavlovic was expelled from the party is important only in that his "triple guilt" already mentioned (Tito, Kosovo, and procedures) was backed off from without any explanation whatsoever, and the only point on the agenda was the "strictly confidential report" (published in its entirety the next day in *POLITIKA*!) about "Vojko and Savle." Thus, at least through Pavlovic's viewfinder, the strange way by which a humoresque was published turned into "humor in politics," but not the kind that makes anyone want to laugh.

All of this would have stayed at the level of an interesting political tale had the author of "Olako obecana brzina" not felt that the events in the meetings of the Serbian LC CC and the Belgrade City Committee of the LC are only manifestations of something much more complex and far-reaching. This reference is to Pavlovic's disagreement with the policy personified in the figure of Slobodan Milosevic. The ideological schism has run along two planes: the conception of the role of the LC in social development and, which would prove to be still more important, the interpretation of the Serbian nationality's position in the Yugoslav community, especially viewed through the prism of the Kosovo problem.

In the debates conducted in the meetings of the Presidium of the Serbian LC CC, Milosevic has allegedly favored application of democratic centralism in a very specific way, in such a way that "centralism" would be "ahead of democracy," that is, the implementation of decisions would "always occur before the debate." This turning of things upside down, as Pavlovic interprets it, has in practice produced "centralistic democratism." The implications are of a change of direction in which

the initiative of the member of the LC and of his basic organization would be replaced by the directive of the leadership, and that leadership would be dominated by the person furnishing the initiative, and that person, what is more, "utters nothing other than eternal truths." Pavlovic explains that in these words: "Under the pressure of an opinion that is self-assured, egocentric, and superior, the machine of so-called democratic centralism—which is actually centralism—grinds up those who are sincerely persuaded and convinced just as it does those who are not, breaks down reasonable and honest men in the same way it does careerists and lackeys, puts the skeptical on the same level with the gullible, the naive, and the uninformed—creating subordinates from them all without distinction." The author of "Olako obecana brzina" is convinced that his political downfall also was an essential contribution to consolidating Milosevic's conception of a new LC. However, Pavlovic says, this "new" LC is actually something already superseded in the post-Cominform period of Yugoslavia's development. It would be more apt, then, to call it a Communist Party, and this means that in future self-management would be pushed to the margins of society. History has confirmed many times that a "bugbear party" can build only a "bugbear socialism." That is in fact why Pavlovic caustically emphasizes that he has no regrets about fighting for the ideals of the LC "as a free-thinking organization of people of like-minded ideology," since he was expelled from the party through the mechanism of a "frameup." After all, Pavlovic says, the fundamental characteristic of the eighth meeting is that it cut short the processes of democratization of the LC and "by the method of intimidation, removal, and judgment without proof" introduce nothing more or less than a "religious cult" such as "has never before been established in freedom-loving Serbia."

Quick Fixes

The Kosovo trauma has surely been that point of departure where relations in the Serbian party leadership broke down. That is, as time has passed, and the situation has not been changing for the better, Pavlovic feels, party members have developed a complex in which "every word uttered against Serbian nationalism is perceived as permissiveness toward separatistic Albanian nationalism." But if that has been a disturbing trend over several years, the situation was radicalized by the speech which Slobodan Milosevic delivered in Kosovo Polje in May 1987. Pavlovic has come to see that "night of the strong words" as Milosevic's drill for the "new role" within the Serbian LC: "After those words, we stopped running in the relay. We drew apart. I began to run from the tragedy, and he ran to meet it." It is interesting to note that Pavlovic places particular insistence that the phrase "easy promise of speed" was by no

means a reflection in Milosevic's speech in Kosovo Polje, although that is the way in which the broadest public perceived it. He was referring, he says, to those increasingly outspoken Serbian nationalists and their "quick fixes" for breaking down the Kosovo counterrevolution. Pavlovic, however, is convinced that a consummate manipulation was involved here: having consciously recognized himself in the phrase, Milosevic in practice initiated the struggle to attribute the policy of rapid resolution of the problems in Kosovo to himself.

In spite of the quite extensive inventory of his political disagreements with the present chairman of Serbian Communists, Pavlovic nevertheless emphasizes the controversies over the "nonexistent" Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Whereas he personally and also the Belgrade City Committee of the LC were constantly concerned with that problem, understanding it to be an extremely dangerous "call for Serbian revanchism," Slobodan Milosevic avoided speaking out in public a single word concerning that programmatic document. He is said to have even prevented publication of the internal condemnation of the Memorandum by the Presidium of the Serbian LC CC, giving a portion of the public the impression that this document was "tacitly accepted." From that angle, Pavlovic's accusations of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts as a "bastion of nationalism," which were unambiguous and public, sounded like "bad manners" and a real anachronism. When we add to that that the tardy debate of "Vojko and Savle" culminated in the moral debasement of the most outspoken opponent of the Memorandum, it turns out that it was the most aggressive grouping within the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts that fared the best in this entire mess.

Revolted by Milosevic's "eloquent silence," Pavlovic has gone back and dug up his speeches in the political forums in which he was a member in recent years and concluded that the present chairman of the Presidium of the Serbian LC CC adopted the ethnocentric way of looking at reality back in 1984, when he spoke at length in favor of casting off the "complex of unitarianism" and "removing the mortgage of historical guilt from the Serbian people." A similar thesis appears in the Memorandum, which is 2 years more recent.

However, 4 years ago Pavlovic did not react at all to such concepts. It seems that Pavlovic is also using his "retroactive memory" to erase the fact that at that time he was in a "pragmatic coalition" with Milosevic and with others as well, a coalition whose main objective was radical renewal of personnel in Serbia. And the basic rule of all such coalitions is that those who have played out their political "roles" necessarily drop out. There was no reason at all why Dragisa Pavlovic should have been an exception in this respect.

INTRABLOC

Warsaw Pact Invasion Capability Assessed 23000073 Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 12, Dec 88 pp732-738

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Hans Peter Menkel, General Staff: "Invasion Capability of the Warsaw Pact Ground Forces"]

[Text] Rarely has a security policy concept achieved rhetorical acceptance as quickly as the catchword about the Warsaw Pact's [WP] invasion capability.

The 1985 white book does not yet have this expression; instead, it speaks of the East bloc's offensive attack capability and of a military potential which far exceeds that which is necessary for defense.

However, the image of a possible invasion by East European armies seems to be far more useful for refreshing the ordinary citizen's awareness of the threat than matter-of-fact numbers and facts have been able to do thus far.

In the meantime the concept has, of course, taken firm hold without having gained in expressiveness. In tracking the security policy discussions of the past few months, we see that the threat from the invasion capability has become the key problem in West European security.

Since no official definition exists yet, the call to reduce the invasion capability as a central phrase in conventional arms control policies is scarcely of any help. All the less so since the Soviets neither concede nor claim that they have an invasion capability and thus are not in a position to negotiate about something that they do not have.

Thus, for concrete political requirements it is essential to define those elements and determining facts which make an invasion capability possible. The following article is therefore an attempt to define these more closely, to examine them in respect to the WP's ground forces and thus in the final analysis to answer the question whether in fact a threat from the invasion capability exists.

Definition

Two steps are necessary in order to be able to give a more exact definition of "invasion capability." On the one hand it has to be kept separate from the concept of "attack or offensive attack capability" which is often used as a synonym, and on the other hand it is necessary to define the characteristics which produce the specific invasion capability.

To begin with, attack or offensive attack capability is present if, in a desired space:

- superior forces which are trained for the attack;
- with appropriate equipment and arms;
- and are present in a timely manner with the appropriate superiority.

Thus, it is a capability which is achieved or strived for primarily at the tactical or operational level. Its essential characteristic is superiority of forces to be used when a target, which is limited in terms of time and space, is to be taken. But invasion capability means more. It presupposes the capability to attack or to go on the offensive at the strategic level, which moreover can be used to surprise the enemy.¹ For only a surprise attack against an unprepared enemy provides adequate assurance of being able to occupy his entire territory and to eliminate his political will.

This suggests that "invasion capability" consists of two main characteristics:

- the capability of strategic surprise
- the capability for a territorial offensive.

These capabilities can be improved by the geostrategic situation, but—as history teaches—it is not a condition for them.

Strategic surprise attack capability is present if:

- the military potential is operationally ready at all times (= operational readiness level),
- the target of the invasion can be reached in short order (= deployment), and,
- preparations can be made without being discovered (= strategic protective concealment).

The capability for a territorial offensive attack presupposes armed forces which:

- are superior to the enemy in numbers,
- have adequate equipment to overcome natural and artificial obstacles (= offensive mobility),
- have the means to be able from the very beginning to threaten the totality of the enemy's territory (= capability to fight in the enemy's depth),
- are able to depend on adequate logistics (= staying power capability) and
- are trained to command attack operations (= offensive operational doctrine and operational principles).

Bild 1: Elemente der Invasionfähigkeit.




Figure 1: Elements of Invasion Capability

Key:

1. The WP's Invasion Capability
2. Favorable geostrategic situation
3. Invasion capability
4. Strategic surprise attack capability
5. Operational readiness level
6. Deployment
7. Protective concealment
8. Territorial offensive attack capability
9. Quantitative superiority
10. Offensive mobility
11. Capability to fight in the enemy's depth
12. Staying power
13. Offensive operational doctrine and principles

This listing reveals that "invasion capability" consists only of the sum of all elements. The individual elements are interdependent, even if they are of different importance. Thus, for example, strategic surprise attack capability depends more on the level of operational readiness and secrecy than on deployment; accordingly, the capability for a territorial offensive attack primarily presupposes superiority and not as a priority the corresponding mobility.

Do the WP Ground Forces Have Invasion Capability?

Operational Readiness Level

In case of war the greatest threat for NATO in central Europe stems first of all from the WP's ground forces in the western forward region, that is, in the GDR, Poland and the CSSR as well as in the Soviet Union's three western military districts. In this sector a total of 69² divisions are stationed which can be made operationally

ready in 24 to 72 hours. The Soviet armed forces in the GDR, Poland and the CSSR must be assigned to operational readiness category A; that is, their peacetime strength amounts to about 75 to 90 percent of the wartime level, which corresponds to a shortage in manpower of about 120,000 soldiers.

It would be possible to transport this personnel by air in 2 days. The semiannual airlifted personnel replacements match the Soviet's experience and routine. Even transporting by rail, which is not so easy to get information on, would take no more than 2 to 3 days if passenger trains and special trains which are regularly in service are employed. Supplementary training of reservists will not take much time since the Soviet Union has adequate personnel in order to man all free billets with soldiers whose 2-year tour of duty ended no more than 5 years earlier.

In an event, initiating offensive operations against central Europe will not depend on having personnel up to full strength. Unmanned billets relate primarily to those functions which are not decisive for the operational readiness of a weapon system or a unit, for example crews in the rear crew compartment of armored personnel carriers or assistant drivers of supply vehicles. Thus, together with its WP armies the Soviet Union would be in a position to initiate surprise offensive attacks and to conduct them until the mobilization reserve is brought up and the units of the successive echelons from the western military districts are added, whose operational readiness and deployment could be completed in 4 to 10 days.

Deployment

The geostrategic location of the Soviet Union and its satellite countries is that of a self-contained continental power having the advantage of the internal line. This provides it with the capability of being able to defend in every direction and to conduct offensives in a decisive direction. Approximately 60 percent of the Soviet ground forces are assigned to the European theater of war and accordingly deployed west of the Ural Mountains. Thus, the major strategic direction becomes quite clear. In addition to these forces there is also the entire military potential of the non-Soviet WP countries.

If in respect to central and western Europe the WP were to restrict itself to a defensive agreement, then in terms of its operational standards about 25 divisions in the first echelon of the army would be sufficient.³ By including 15 additional divisions of the following echelon or the general reserve a total of about 40 divisions would be in a position to insure adequate protection against possible attacks from the west. However, a total of 55 divisions of Soviet and non-Soviet ground forces are in fact deployed in the 500-km sector along the border. Thus, the WP has the necessary forces to produce high numerical superiority in three penetration sectors during initial operations.

Strategic Protective Concealment

As far as the Soviets are concerned strategic protective concealment is the essential component of strategic surprise. However, experiences gained in World War II demonstrate that absolute surprise and protective concealment of attack preparations are impossible. As a result, the attempt is made to "overfeed" the enemy with information in order to convey to him in this way an ambiguous, or better, a false picture. The perfection of today's reconnaissance resources provide an opportunity to have the—wrong—assessment which was gained from the enemy confirmed.

The main target of strategic deception is the enemy's political command. Here, too, it is not a matter of total surprise. It is sufficient to simulate for it a situation which, in spite of known attack preparations, causes it to undertake attack preparations or other countermeasures.

Protective concealment of steps taken in war preparations is not only facilitated by the centrally oriented system of government in the WP countries, mainly the Soviet Union, but also because of the advantage of having better knowledge of NATO's expectations in respect to preliminary activities for a war and initiating it than is true in reverse. Since we discuss our scenarios for war preliminaries very openly it would certainly not be difficult for the WP to prepare attack plans which are based on the opposite of what we expect.

Within the context of strategic protective concealment the phase of preparing for war and of the immediate beginning of war plays an important role to the extent that the WP clearly understands that the effect of a surprise attack quickly deteriorates. As a consequence, the basic issue is to achieve the war targets in a relatively short time.

In respect to the armed forces this means keeping them at such a high level of combat readiness that the transition from peace to a state of war can take place without being discovered and without delay.⁴

Summary Evaluation of the Strategic Surprise Attack Capability

Level of operational readiness, deployment and opportunities for strategic protective concealment provide the WP's ground forces with the capability for surprise at the strategic level. They meet the demand to conduct every deployment and attack operation with surprise and success.

This means that the conditions for a fast decision in the event of war have been created in peacetime. This satisfies a subcondition of invasion capability.

Quantitative Superiority

In the primary weapon systems of the ground forces the WP has a numerical superiority which permits it to produce in key attack areas a balance of forces which can be more than six times as big.

Ignoring additional inventories in depots the details of the balance of forces in central Europe⁵ are as follows:

	Main Battletanks	Type/Rocket Launchers	Armored Personnel Carriers/ Armored Combat Vehicles	Attack Helicopters
WP	26,900	22,900	59,900	1,630
NATO	11,250	7,300	28,400	675
	1:2.4	1:3.1	1:2.1	1:2.4

A look at developments since 1970 makes it very clear what enormous effort the WP has devoted to enlarging its offensive potential.

If we take into consideration the reinforcement forces on both sides, NATO, including France and Spain, has about 7,000 main battletanks, the WP, however, about 22,000, that is, a threefold increase. The development in the artillery weapons is even more serious. While NATO did not increase the number of guns, including multiple rockets and mortars, between 1970 and today, the increase in the WP amounted to about 25,000. Its current 47,500 artillery weapons guarantee it a more than threefold superiority over NATO's 15,400 systems.

NATO always attempted to offset the WP's numerical superiority by qualitative superiority. For main battletanks this was successful up to the end of the 1970's. About 35 percent of its fleet of main battletanks could be called modern at that time where only about 12 percent of the WP's main battletanks had comparable technology. The WP used this fact to justify its numerical superiority. However, the development which is continuing even today shows that the WP not only expanded its numerical superiority, but at the same time improved the technology. The share of modern main battletanks which have weapon stabilization equipment, automatic range finding and an integrated fire control system is about equal today on both sides at about 40 percent. In absolute numbers this means, however, that approximately 23,000 WP tanks have the most modern technology in contrast to approximately 9,700 NATO tanks with comparable standards. Noteworthy in this connection is what capacities the arms industry in the socialist economy requires in order to make these potentials available.

In any event, in years gone by NATO did not have a qualitative advantage in its artillery weapons. Both sides still have a large number of older systems. Both alliances have only slowly introduced modern guns. At present about 20 percent in their arsenals is modern. However, in the second half of the 1970's the WP introduced far more modern guns than NATO did. It used self-propelled mounts to replace the artillery troops' equipment, which up to then had consisted exclusively of towed guns. This made a noticeable increase in mobility and survivability as well as effectiveness in supporting armored combat forces.

In addition to the traditional weapon systems—main battle tanks and artillery—the attack helicopter has developed into a threatening element of new quality. Of the helicopters in the Soviet Union which had been placed in service prior to 1970 only half was armed, and in part this armament was more for self-protection. Since then, however, the helicopter has become increasingly more important as an independent military resource. Today the division in the WP has its own attack helicopter unit, the army has its own attack helicopter regiment with about 70 helicopters.

The above comparison makes it clear that the WP has disproportionately expanded the weapon arsenal of its ground forces. Quality and performance capability of the tanks, guns and attack helicopters have not only achieved the NATO standard, but exceeded it in subsectors.

Because of its superiority in operational forces the WP is positioned to organize, in terms of time, how it develops and moves its mobilization-dependent forces forward so that in keeping with its operational principles (echelon system) these forces are then available at full combat strength if they are needed. In case of conflict, varying geostrategic conditions could therefore produce an asymmetric development of the mobilization-dependent forces. The consequence of that would be that the WP's superiority would continue to increase until such time as NATO's reinforcements/reserves arrived.

Offensive Mobility

The equipment of the WP ground forces reflects the special features of the European theater of war. Long coastlines, numerous bodies of water and river courses and the expected number of obstacles could impede fast and territorial operations. As a result there is an array of means available which assures offensive mobility.

These include primarily:

- units for amphibious operations,
- combat forces which are equipped to cross bodies of water and,
- armed forces with high mine-clearing capacity.

For the Baltic Sea region the WP has available a Soviet and a Polish brigade for amphibious operations. By way of reinforcement for their infantry battalions they have their own armored battalion and tube and rocket artillery detachments. Transportation across water is taken care of by the Baltic Sea fleet and the WP merchant marines. At least once a year they engage in joint water-landing maneuvers. Their job in case of war is to support the naval forces in capturing the Baltic Sea exits. This is done in close cooperation with the ground forces.

If the WP were to restrict itself to defending its border, special forces and exercises for landing on enemy coasts would not be necessary.

The situation is similar in respect to equipping its combat forces to cross bodies of water. The available bridge and ferry equipment far exceeds the level necessary to guarantee movement within their own country in case of a national defense emergency.

With its own equipment a tank regiment can cross an 18-meter-wide water obstacle simultaneously at five places; a motorized rifle regiment can simultaneously create four crossing possibilities. Obstacles up to 40 meters wide can be negotiated by the regiment at one location. The load capacity of the bridges makes it possible to get all combat vehicles across; in any case they are all amphibious or capable of moving under water.

At the division level the collapsible floating bridges are the primary crossing means. With its standard equipment the division can build 6 crossing points along bodies of water which are up to 50 meters wide or 2 bridges to span 190 meters. Army troops have five sets of this equipment, and when at the front seven additional sets.

In addition to the bridge equipment, the equipment of the division, army and front engineer units includes type GSP and PTS-M tracked self-propelled ferries and tracked amphibious trucks. These resources make it possible to bring up main battle tanks, guns and troops across very wide bodies of water.

In view of the geography of bodies of water in central and western Europe⁶ the WP ground forces are in a position to cross about 90 percent of the rivers with armored vehicle-launched bridges and approximately 80 percent with auxiliary bridges. This provides an essential condition to conduct territorial operations.

A defender who has inferior numbers of forces is forced, among other things, to block a part of his space with mines. His own mine-clearing capacity, however, need only be geared to the capability of removing or destroying mines he has laid.

However, an attacker has to be able to carry out movements with as few limitations as possible. To that extent, the scope of his mine-clearing potential reveals information about the offensive organization of his armed forces.

The WP's ground forces have this necessary potential. Almost every third T-55 to T-80 main battle tank is equipped with mine-clearing devices. Thus, every tank platoon has the capability of creating under fire protection/armor protection a minefield lane without additional support. The type BMP-1 and BMP-2 armored personnel carriers are likewise being increasingly outfitted with such equipment.

In addition, the division has mine-clearing tanks which can quickly create effective minefield lanes with the help of detonating tubes.

On the other hand, equipment with minelaying devices is comparatively poor. For this purpose a Soviet division can only employ three devices whereas the tank divisions and motorized rifle divisions of the NVA [National People's Army] and PVA [Polish People's Army] each have about 20 automatic laying devices.

Combat Capability in the Enemy's Depth

According to the familiar Soviet view, the attack serves as the main beginning of the battle to smash the enemy completely. In this connection it is important to fight the enemy from the beginning of the attack also in his depth. These operations are limited not only to the rear division and corps regions, but also include the enemy's entire hinterland. Their essential targets are to destroy nuclear delivery systems, field headquarters, command and control facilities and reserves, as well as traffic and logistics facilities which are also important in war.

Surprise Attack Detachments

In the past few years the WP has created an appropriate apparatus. At the regiment and division level so-called surprise attack detachments can be established from forces and units which are supposed to operate in front or behind opposing enemy forces. They can be deployed either independently or together with airborne troops. They consist of reinforced regiments or battalions if they are deployed by the division, of reinforced battalions or companies when deployed by the regiment. As a rule they belong to parts of the following division or regiment echelon. They can be utilized up to 30 to 50 km in advance of the main forces.

Operational Maneuver Groups

At the army or front level special maneuver groups, which can operate up to 80 km in advance of the main forces, are provided for these tasks. They are composed of tank or motorized rifle divisions which are reinforced by artillery and air strike forces. Their rate of attack can reach 80 to 100 km per day—that is, twice the normal speed of attack; the period of operation is limited to 2 to 3 days.

The target of a surprise attack detachment or the OMG [operational maneuver groups] is to smash or destroy particularly important elements in the enemy's defense depth, including the reserves, and secondarily to secure or take areas.

Thus, an essential condition for their success is taking advantage of the moment of surprise attack. A large part of their movements and combat actions will take place utilizing darkness and poor visibility. For the long-range fire support of advance units the WP has developed plans which provide for the carefully arranged concentration of reconnaissance and fighting resources. So-called "reconnaissance/fire groups" are therefore supposed to smash targets at a depth of up to 50 km. They are composed of a combination of EDP-assisted reconnaissance resources and tube artillery including multiple rocket launchers. Their employment usually takes place at the division level.

The army or front has a larger variety of target acquisition equipment and artillery with a large range. Linking these system in so-called reconnaissance/strike groups, which also involve missile systems and air support forces, is to be responsible for annihilating targets at a depth of up to 300 km.

This fire support is in addition to the familiar fire support forces and resources which normally accompany unit operations.

Short-Range Missiles

Among other things, operational maneuver groups require support of fire power far into the enemy's depth. In addition to the air forces, tactical rocket units have been integrated for this purpose into the WP's ground forces.

At the division level the NSWP [non-Soviet Warsaw Pact] countries in the western forward region have FK [missile] systems with a range between 90 km (FROG) and 100 km (SS-21). However, the army represents the greatest threat with its FK potential. While NVA/PVA/CVA [Czechoslovakian People's Army] at this command level have only a few SCUD (280 km), the GSTD [Group of Soviet Forces in Germany] armies carry numerous SCUD and SS-21/SCARAB systems (see No 10, 1988, p 586).

This superiority can be even further increased at the front level through the FK potential (=SCUD).

Upon implementation of the December 1987 INF Treaty the WP ground forces deployed in the European theater of war will have a total of over 1,355 carrier and launch vehicles (TAFz) for short-range missiles; these include:

- 635 FROG TAFz
- 140 SS-21 TAFz
- 580 SCUD TAFz

Airmobile Forces

At the operation and strategic level airborne units are still used for the classical conventional attack. Mainly the Soviet ground forces have an airborne and air transport potential which enables them to reach almost any point in central and western Europe. Their current strength comprises a goal of eight airborne divisions for long-range strategic operations. Half of these units are stationed west of the Urals and can be used in the European theater of war. For direct operational support for vertical envelopments the fronts of the first and following echelon, including PVA and CVA forces, have their own air assault brigade; a large part of their armies have an independent air assault battalion.

The requirements for air transport space are also met by Aeroflot's civilian fleet of aircraft.

For airborne operations at the tactical level every division commander in the WP ground forces can rely of his own transport potential in the form of the helicopter unit under his command.

Landing combat troops to the enemy's rear is part of the training of motorized rifle regiments.

As a result the WP undertakes no exercise without using airborne units at the most diverse levels.

Covert Operations Forces

Scouting important targets via espionage in peacetime is the foundation of operations in case of war. Subversion and sabotage actions are intensified just before starting to attack and during the engagement. The goal is to weaken the enemy as far as possible in order to create favorable conditions for penetrating the forward defense.

Such measures are the responsibility of the covert operations forces.

These can work jointly with the regular forces during the engagement.

In times of tension and crisis civilian command centers, field headquarters and vital facilities are attacked in the overall combat zone and primarily in the hinterland using open and covert operations and actions. Acts of sabotage, disinformation measures and acts of terrorism help to further weaken the defender before beginning combat action.

The forces for this already exist in peacetime in the armies and military districts. As so-called special purpose troops they are, of course, regular members of the army, but use the methods of covert operations. Thus, they are probably used in squad strength. For the central European area it would be possible to utilize a number of independently operating groups which will also undertake independent reconnaissance in addition to their combat duties.

Logistic Staying Power

In addition to the extensive ammunition and fuel depots for troops already in the forward region the WP's logistic preparations also include additional depot areas in the GDR, CSSR and western Poland. The amount of supplies is very adequate for longer, highly intense operations, even if losses of supplies are figured in; preparations have been made for resupply.

Operational Doctrine and Principles

The operational doctrine and principles stress the fact that attack is the decisive type of combat. Defense is subordinate to attack, it is utilized only if savings in forces resulting from its use are to be used elsewhere to develop a main attack, or if the balance of forces is so unfavorable that an attack would be possible only with unacceptable losses.

Basically the WP endeavors to shift, after penetrating the enemy's initial defense, to deep-ranging mobile operations of mechanized forces, which are supported by the air force and which press forward without interruption as far as the operational targets by utilizing ongoing replacement of worn out forces.

Thus, more attention is paid than previously to independent behavior in the initial and continuing training of leaders. Battalion commanders of the combat forces today have organically all elements in their unit which permit them—even if in a very limited way—to lead combined arms combat. This demands mobility and initiative in the command personnel at all levels and is directed not least at the ability to lead attack operations quickly, territorially and with a great deal of independence.

This is the only way to achieve at the tactical-operational level what is required by the strategic command and which functions as the supreme maxim in case of war: hit the enemy in his territory with a devastating defeat.

Summary Assessment

The analysis of the elements and factors which are the basis of invasion capability shows that the WP possesses an invasion capability vis-a-vis central and western Europe. It is based on its capability for strategic surprise attacks and its capability for territorial offensives.

The explication of this capability and the strategic options which stem from it does not mean imputing to the WP that it will make use of these possibilities. There

must be a clear distinction between political intentions and military potential and capabilities. In arms control negotiations potentials and capabilities can be targeted. But political intentions cannot be negotiated.

Operational readiness level, deployment and superiority of forces are for us the most threatening features of the invasion capability. For NATO in central Europe a reduction or limitation of these features would mean the elimination of the WP's invasion capability.

Therefore, even in these sectors there should be an arms control policy start. A reduction of the forces in the forward area would, for example, decrease not only the superiority of forces, but would also affect the operational readiness level and deployment. In this it would be a matter of not only withdrawing these forces, but actually decreasing them. The recommendation, which is currently being developed in NATO, for equal upper limits on personnel and decisive large equipment appears to be the right way to this goal.

Footnotes

1. A conceptual arrangement is also possible, such as: attack capability= characteristic of the tactical level offensive attack capability= characteristic of the operational level invasion capability= characteristic of the strategic level.

2. All figures cited were taken from the "1987 NATO-Warsaw Pact Armed Forces Comparison," Ministry of Defense, December 1987.

3. With a border about 1,000 km long between the Alps and the Baltic Sea

4. Last demanded by Army General Yazov, minister of defense, in "On Guard for Socialism and Peace," Moscow, 1987.

5. NATO: Great Britain, France, Benelux, FRG, Denmark. WP: GDR, Poland, CSSR, Baltic military districts, White Russia, the Carpathian Mountains.

6. In the north-south direction central/western Europe is traversed by bodies of water which can be an obstacle every 5 to 6 km. In the FRG approximately 95 percent of them are less than 18 meters wide.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Overview of NVA Political Training Provided
23000082 Bonn INFORMATIONEN FUER DIE
TRUPPE in German No 12, Dec 88 pp 32-47

[Article by Thomas Beck: "Political Work in the National People's Army"]

[Text] We live in an epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism. That is, at least according to the Marxist-Leninist world view. In order to solve the individual

ideological problems deriving from this thesis, a large amount of detailed political work must be performed in the socialist states. The GDR as well is no exception, in particular when it involves the political education of its soldiers in the border troops and in the NVA [National People's Army]. The intensive and ever-present political work results in a large burden on the time in service. In the end, the product and goal, so to speak, is the socialist soldier's personality, which is able to fight the class enemy. The relationship of what is demanded as compared to what is reality for the GDR soldiers, based on the goals mentioned, is shown by our author Thomas Beck, M.A., who recently submitted to Eberhard-Karls-Universitaet in Tuebingen his dissertation on the subject "Political Work and Political Organs of the Border Troops of the GDR."

According to the Marxist-Leninist world philosophy, it is primarily the social order which determines the character of armed forces. Based on this, it also becomes possible to understand the statement that a gun is a good gun when it is there for a good cause.

However, it is not just the purpose and goals of the armed forces of socialist and Western countries that are regarded as fundamentally different. On the contrary; it is maintained that socialist armies have a moral, social and military superiority. This is justified not only by the superiority of a Marxist-Leninist party leadership as the "source of strength and invincibility," but also by the fact that the mission of the army is in harmony with the objective legitimacies of our epoch, which is defined as a transitional epoch from capitalism to socialism. Further, one also points to the superiority of the new social relations which have resulted from this, that superiors and subordinates, being "class comrades," represent the identical basic interests. And, finally, socialist soldiers are subjected to greater discipline, which is derived from political conviction.

Officially, however, since the end of the 1970's there is no longer talk about a numerical superiority in the area of armament—but there is regarding detrimental external effects. But it is precisely because of the alleged approximate balance in all weapon categories relevant to the comparison of strength, that the so-called political-moral factor grows in importance for combat.

The often touted but never proven and also never provable advantages of socialist combat forces are based on the principle of "Unity of Political and Military Training and Education" as the foremost principle of commanding. Organizationally, this results in the entire military apparatus being penetrated by a weave of political organs, party and FDJ [Free German Youth] organizations for the purpose of political schooling, control and mobilization.

This is the purpose of the principle of 1-man command in "Unity of Political and Military Leadership," meaning the chief/commander bears full responsibility for

both components. However, in order on the one hand to support him, and on the other to control him, a "representative for political duties," who has available to him a separate service and reporting channel, has been assigned to the commander.

The enormous expense in organization and time for political work contributes substantially to the great burden on the service time, although some forms of political work depend on "volunteering" (about 16 hours per month of political schooling, and about 20 to 30 minutes daily of current political information, cultural work in leisure time, SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany]/FDJ meetings and education).

Here it becomes clear what a high priority the GDR leadership places on political education in order for the military to accomplish its mission. It is the military which is to make military training fruitful by mobilizing the people to use all available technical, physical and mental powers to increase combat capability and readiness to fight. It is therefore only logical that the effectiveness of political work is ultimately measured by the military results achieved. Thus, poor training results or exercise achievements, for example, as well as an accumulation of disciplinary measures in one unit, are seen primarily as political questions, and the deeper reasons for failure are of a political nature. The so-called political-moral condition of the troop is regarded as a decisive factor of combat readiness.

A central term for the description of the political-moral condition is defense morale, which as "class morale" reflects the social conditions, according to the Marxist-Leninist understanding. It encompasses the attitude of the class on all matters of national defense and to military service.

In addition to material foundations—as owners of the social property all soldiers have the same relationship toward the means of production—it is also the political (state system/power issue) and ideological foundations (world philosophy), whose contents determine defense morale. These are fed by socialist defense motives, which, as the GDR understands it, are present in a soldier when he understands the legitimacy of the victory of socialism, regards the class interests as his own and identifies with the policies of the party. Through political and ideological work with the soldiers, socialist defense motives are to be formed, the totality of which constitutes defense morale.

The values and contents to be imparted in this process are equally obligatory for general defense propaganda, premilitary training and political work in the NVA and the border troops. The difference of positive and negative defense motives is presented, which is to provide the answer to the questions:

Positive defense motive:

—For which values and socialist achievements am I fighting?

—On whose side am I fighting (comradeship in arms)

Negative defense motive:

—For which purpose, for which goal am I fighting?

—Against which enemy am I fighting?

The direct relationship between military accomplishment and politically triggered motivation, attributed to Engels and Lenin, is represented with absoluteness. The GDR military press thus frequently receives readers' letters, after-action reports from military collectives or combat programs from units, in which it is determined that greater combat readiness results from political-ideological work. The promise by a communications unit of the border troops to achieve above-average results in political, combat and special training, through aggressive political work and intensive study of the documents of the SED party congress, can certainly be seen as typical.

The Socialist Soldier's Personality

The product and goal of military and political-ideological education and training is the Socialist Soldier's Personality. It combines all the properties desired by the party. Excluding classical soldier's virtues such as obedience, discipline, comradeship, etc., as well as efforts to master the military craft, the list of desired characteristics essentially coincides with the contents of political work:

—loyalty to class and party

—love for the socialist fatherland

—embrace of proletarian internationalism and comradeship-in-arms

—readiness and capability to fulfill the oath to the flag, the constitutional duty and every command by the state and party leadership

—hatred for imperialism and its mercenaries.

All political-ideological, moral, military and psychological characteristics serve the purpose of unconditional and imaginative fulfillment of all political and military tasks imposed, including under enemy action. The Western observer is unused to seeing military literature frequently discussing not only the soldier's military tasks but his political ones as well.

For the border troops in particular, which are exposed to "enemy influence" daily, there is justification in talking about political duties: for example, the deliberate and tactically correct behavior of the border guard vis-a-vis Western "provocations" or the ignoring of attempts to

establish personal contact. Whether the border guard acts "correctly" because he is told to do so by his political convictions or simply out of fear of disciplinary reprisals, cannot be determined with certainty either by the outside observer or by his superiors. Here is the main problem in evaluating the effectiveness of political work. Individuals react differently in comparable situations, and even correct behavior in the sense of the task does not necessarily allow the conclusion that it was politically conditioned. Since no objective standard for political conviction exists, there also can be no proof of the political-moral and combat superiority of the socialist soldier's personality as compared to the "Bundeswehr [Federal Armed Forces] mercenary."

Socialist Comradeship Relations and Leadership

In comparison with nonsocialist armed forces the GDR demands of its armed components a higher quality of relations between superiors and subordinates, as well as between equal ranks.

Superiors and subordinates are above all class comrades with identical basic interests. For the superior this includes the obligation of exercising the command authority transferred to him exclusively in the interest of the workers' class and only for official purposes. Subordinates are obligated to obey the received orders unconditionally, completely and with great initiative. "As soldiers of our army we serve not the superior but our socialist society. And in this capacity, superiors and subordinates are equal to one another." it says in an edition of the training periodical WISSEN UND KAEMPFEN, published by the main political administration of the NVA.

The thesis is also put forward in idealized form: That as class brothers superiors and subordinates uphold the same idea and their efforts are aimed at realizing the military policies of the SED.

During the 18-month-long military service, held in training regiments near and farther from the border, the newly arrived soldiers of the second service half-year and the "old guys" of the third service half-year meet in the Border Company. The "old ones" already have border experience, are usually post leaders and assume sponsorship of the "young ones." Former border guards report that soldiers in the 3d service half-year occasionally take out their "frustrations" on the new ones, "delegate" unpleasant duties and as future EK's (candidates for discharge) boast about the short time of service remaining. According to the handbook for political work one should proceed "with party-like consistency," in the event older service half-years arrogate special rights to themselves.

For obvious reasons, no figures over disciplinary violations or disturbances of collective relations are available. It must be assumed, however, the discipline is far more dependent on system-neutral factors of everyday troop activity than on ideological factors.

Less freedom of movement, little leisure time, physically and psychologically difficult service conditions, a heavy service workload, irregular shift rhythm and monotony in the border service are factors which necessarily have just as much influence on the interpersonal area as on discipline. Since these effects depend on concrete, factual, events, primarily the leadership behavior of the superiors, general statements are not appropriate.

It is striking how discussions of disciplinary questions accumulate in military publications. Contributions in the open military press have a mainly appellative character, while in internal publications fundamental issues are discussed and sometimes concrete disciplinary infractions (such as alcohol, tardiness) are addressed.

Official statements on disciplinary training can be summed up in the form of theses:

- Discipline in socialism is class discipline.
- It is deliberate discipline based on realizing necessity. The soldier acts not because he must, but because he wants to. Discipline and freedom are one.
- Undisciplined conduct is in fact foreign to the nature of socialism, but not yet entirely overcome.
- Discipline is the "mother of victory" and is measured in combat readiness.
- It differs in quality from the discipline of imperialist armies.
- Disciplinary infractions usually have ideological reasons and can be overcome through political work.

Considerable doubt has been voiced about this list of theses, since it cannot be proved what the actual reasons for disciplinary infractions are. Formal discipline can be created through pressure and sanctions. This can be shown by means of an actual case. A former border guard reported that soldiers frequently overstayed the 6 pm to midnight leave which was granted once a week. The result was that when one soldier was not punctual, all the other soldiers who were not on border duty had to go out and look for their comrade. This resulted in an indirect, collective training effect: In order not to be disturbed in their sleep, the comrades exercised social pressure on the tardy ones. An effective, but questionable method!

It is expected of the superiors that they should not hush up and minimize violations and disciplinary infractions, while at the same time they are expected to transfer responsibility to the soldiers and give them help.

The demand for "pedagogical tact" instead of rough conduct and pressure, as well as for the most extensive inclusion of the soldier in command decisions (transparency) and duty-oriented command behavior, are demands for modern military leadership. They also

permit flexible handling of the formerly rigid command tactics. For the border troops in particular, a certain measure of individual action by the post is indispensable.

Political Control

Confidence is the basis of good interpersonal relations. In view of the strong politicization of life in the military, it is appropriate to ask how far this influences comradeship.

The training publication KNOWLEDGE AND COMBAT speaks of the necessity of "immunizing the personnel against enemy influences." An ideological offensive on a broad front is required. This shows that the leadership assumes the presence of enemy influences in the NVA and border troops. The result is a necessity for solid political control, in order to be informed at all times about the political and moral condition. For the border troops, to whom, as we know, peace means live action, this appears even more urgent than for the NVA.

The handbook for political work even addresses the problem of external political adaptation combined with a lack of inner identification: "No party organization, no responsible comrade may be satisfied when someone agrees with him or her officially, but unofficially, so to speak behind the extended hand, represents positions that disagree with the policies of the party and are foreign to the worker's class...Such double-dealing weakens the power of the military collective, reduces its combat readiness and must be decisively defeated...The superior and the collective must know what the individual thinks, what moves him, in order to influence him, to be able to help him in his personal development."

This help could definitely result in the soldier's private sphere being damaged. The educational power of the collective is evident in the use of criticism and self-criticism in order politically to probe into misguided military behavior. Thus, a soldier who had fallen asleep on guard was accused by the FDJ basic organization of not possessing the correct political awareness, since he would otherwise never have fallen asleep due to the aggravated international situation (!).

The process of political accusation, self-accusation, remorse and subsequent self-obligation to political activities or military duties can be more painful than accepting the disciplinary measures that are due in any event. The goal of integration, toward which one strives with criticism and self-criticism as the tools of education, can easily be missed with excessively harsh use and have the opposite effect: Retreat into private behavior, with reinforced external adaptation.

The evaluation and grading of verbal contributions in the framework of political training by the training group leader is only a mild, yet recognizable, form of political standardization. The soldier quickly learns to live with

not posing certain questions and repeating by rote predetermined word patterns, in order to obtain a good grade in "Politics." This no longer has anything to do with political opinions and convictions.

Effective with regard to gaining information is the system of spying by the comrades. Even conscripted personnel sometimes periodically deliver information about members of their collective, often against their will. The information goes to certain superiors or directly to the liaison officer of the Ministry for State Security attached to the battalion. The so-called secret collaborators or secret informants are to evaluate comrades politically, to pass on statements, explain personal backgrounds. Everyone knows that in one's own unit there are several such informants. Political hypocrisy and formal adjustment are the results. The effects on comradeship are obvious.

The "authorities" are always well informed about moods and opinions by means of the system of informants. But this exacts a high price, namely interference with the collective atmosphere. The question must be asked whether political intolerance by the political and security authorities, their lack of confidence in the often avowed maturity of the socialist soldier's personality is not counterproductive in the sense that spying by apolitical, even politically "positive" soldiers imparts deeply felt experiences, which perhaps create oppositional attitudes.

The fact that shortcomings still exist in the area of leadership is also demonstrated by the demand of the 12th SED Representatives' Conference, that in the NVA and the border troops a clear step forward should be made in the field of leadership (!). In order to produce political awareness, far more than good political education is needed. It is rightly pointed out that the soldier's practical everyday experiences, above all, mold his awareness. Here, the described difficulties and contradictions, in part system-neutral, but primarily produced by the political system through pressure to conform, become evident. In their effect they are often the opposite of the goals of political work.

From what has been said so far, it becomes clear that combat training as the principal training cannot be simply just a military affair: "Combat training, together with political education, is the principal field of preparation for victory in combat." Lenin already showed the connection of political and combat training, according to which in war the victory ultimately depends on the fighting spirit of the masses, who shed their blood on the field of battle. The booklet "The Small Country" by L. Brezhnev, often used in the GDR, shows, for example, in the person of the political officer Brezhnev, what significance precisely political work has for the preparation of an assault. In combat the political officer in the NVA and border troops must be up front with the soldiers, must unremittingly lead the political work, explain the

combat duty, provide psychological motivation and neutralize negative influences. Objections to the effect that due to the impact of modern conventional means and weapons of mass destruction, human factors such as fighting spirit and defense morale would be made relative by technology and automation in conducting operations, are thoroughly refuted. The human remains the determining force in the relationship of humans and technology. Considering the modern pattern of war, the role of the human being is even regarded as in the process of growing. Therefore, the importance of political work automatically grows with it before and during combat. Intensification of combat training also means an increase in the psychological stability of the troops. The ability in every situation to overcome negative circumstances through willpower and to maintain initiative and activity is defined as the principal factor of combat readiness. The justification of political work in combat is that each soldier is included in the ideological conflict through the influence of enemy propaganda. Above all, however, it is justified with the psychological effects of modern weapons: Fear of tanks and nuclear fear have possibly led to desperation and panic and awakened a feeling of senselessness of the fighting. Knowledge of the dangers and the possibility of protection, close-combat training with real elements of danger and risk are suitable, in combination with incessant political work, for bringing about a "steeling of the psyche." Influencing the consciousness of the soldier makes it possible for the most part to neutralize negative psychological effects of wartime activities.

Special Problems in the Border Troops

The remarks made so far apply largely to both the People's Army and the border troops, but in the following a few problems specific to the border troops will be addressed.

Border service, "combat service in peacetime" is much more concrete than service in the People's Army. Real, no longer irrevocable, action is required. The closeness to the enemy and his "ideological attacks" (?) in the opinion of the GDR pose particular demands on the political and psychological elements of combat training. These points are all the more important to the daily border service, since the soldiers as a rule are left on their own in pairs (guard pair) and do not act within the system of a larger military collective, as in NVA units.

Formalism, schematism and lack of initiative in training are rejected by the highest authority just as much as "play-acting" by the simulated border. What is intended is simulation of border violations and enemy activity at the artificial training borders of the training regiments. What is demanded is not a one-time outstanding performance in the border service, but continuous readiness to act in every situation. This, by GDR standards open, criticism of the training practices shows that there must still, after decades of border protection, be weak points in the training. The criticism culminates with the

demand that "the border soldiers should be confronted with situations which must anticipate in view of the growing harshness of the class confrontations and the increasingly refined and more brutal attacks by the enemy on the national border of the GDR."

Col Gen Thieme criticizes the "training psychology that can still be encountered" (nothing can happen, it's only an exercise). Instead, he demands tough, realistic stress situations, which "require the last ounce of everyone," meaning "more imaginatively designed night exercises," rapidly changing situations and unexpected deployment of simulation devices. Realistic counterrepresentation, according to Thieme, also includes "use of enemy subversive and paramilitary groups and their infiltration and exfiltration by means of helicopters."

Here the connection between combat training and political work becomes clear: The self-projected image of the class enemy begins to come alive and to act. As a result, to the border soldiers it becomes a fictitious reality, which on its part confirms the picture of the enemy produced by the political training. The enemy image becomes self-sustaining and develops its own dynamic through the combination of theory and practice. What is described here as realistic, is based on assignments.

It may be assumed that the border troop command itself does not take into consideration the possibility of such an action, but is using an aid intended to make the soldier believe the desired image of the enemy.

These demands are in contrast to factors relating to everyday life in the border service, which can have negative effects on the political and psychological readiness: separation of the guard pair from the unit during border protection, monotony and boredom through uneventfulness in the border service, one-sided use of fewer human authorities, routine and because of it fatigue, an unnatural (in shifts) rhythm in changing the guard, climatic, terrain-related, seasonal conditions, intense burden on duty time and nominally a minimal leave with a short annual vacation (12 days) and rare weekend passes for the conscripts.

In order to counteract such framework conditions with potentially negative results for combat readiness, test situations must constantly be created during training, and during political work the soldier's personal responsibility for protecting the border must continuously be made clear. This is the aim of, among other things, the "current political information" which must be completed daily before muster, which deals with the political and military situation in the security sector, with points of emphasis in border protection, with the significance of border tactics and the political necessity of border protection. Special events, such as "Western provocation," are here often played up out of proportion. This is the same direction in which political teaching, the use of agitators in the units, the work with traditions and culture during leisure time, are supposed to work. But

precisely the excessive ideological weight of everyday life, the one-sidedness of political work and the overdrawn enemy image, imparted with an aggressive and radical vocabulary, are entirely likely to trigger negative effects instead in some border soldiers.

Of importance is furthermore the personal behavior of the immediate superior of the border soldier. What is decisive is not what the superior says about the enemy, but how serious he himself is about the enemy. Reports about escaped border soldiers allow for the cautious conclusion that word and deed do not always agree in this area. When asked about the enemy image, the basic substance turned out to be that the prayer-wheel-like repetition of all too well known phrases is more likely to lead to political desensitization, because real everyday life in the service often contradicts the political image of the enemy. Instead of the aggressive class enemy, the soldiers usually experienced uneventful monotony, occasionally interrupted by false alarms and interludes.

When border penetrations occur, they take place in the direction of east to west. There is every appearance that members of the border troops have difficulties seeing the "class enemy" in a runaway from the republic. The gist of what was said by the people interviewed was that it is the nightmare of the majority of the border troops one day to have to shoot at a fugitive—in which the likelihood is great that the fugitive is a comrade.

"Provocations" of the post from the Western side act along the same lines as the enemy image work by the border troop leadership. They provide new pretexts and unintentionally legitimize the behavior of the border troops. Unfortunately, fewer and fewer attacks on the metal fence are being undertaken by the private side. The border soldiers are not told, of course, that the Federal Border Guard prevents such activity wherever it can. Personal insults, affronts or tactless remarks to the border soldiers are at most suitable for reinforcing the "political and moral readiness" of the soldiers.

ALBANIA

Ministry Blamed for Losses of Pyrite Concentrate *21000004 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian* 5 Oct 88 p 2

[Article by Bashkim Koci: "The Cadres Go and Come, the Pyrite Concentrate for Export is Lost on the Way"]

[Text] At the section for industry in the Executive Committee of the Mirdite District People's Council we were told: "The losses of pyrite concentrates for export are more than 8 percent, from the producer to the collection center. Losses," they continued, "are also considerable for copper concentrates. Therefore, as an issue, this is very disturbing, and it has been and still is a matter of discussion both for the state organs in Mirdite and for the departments, the Ministry of Industry and Mines, the Ministry of Transportation and the General Machine Directorate."

Regarding this issue, many meetings and face-to-face discussions have been held, briefings have been given, acts of arbitration organized and decisions taken, but the situation has not changed. Why? At the Ministry of Industry and Mines they tell us: "Those at the Ministry of Transportation are to be blamed." While, the other side blames those who do not assure the indices of moisture for the transport of mineral ores, it seems that the issue is "throw and wait." The attitude of the Executive Committee of the District People's Council has been and is, so to speak, neutral: "Let the department solve it."

At first glance, it seems that everyone is making some effort on his own, but, if you go into it deeply, in order to see what really is the dimension of this disturbance felt by the responsible elements, you conclude that a minimum of effort is being exerted in regard to these losses.

At the Automobile Transport Directorate in the Ministry of Transport people told us: "We have specialized vehicles for the transport of concentrates; and, in regard to this, the monitoring from above have found that we have done well. In order not to violate the regulations, which we have established, we published an order as a department." There, they explain that there have been and will be losses as long as the percentage of moisture in the ore is not up to the required standard; while—where the ore is loaded and unloaded, miners and leaders say loudly: "Other vehicles are needed; those are unsuitable;" and, at the Ministry of Transportation, people keep silent. Even the opinions of some innovators on improving the vehicles assigned to the transportation of pyrite ores are forgotten. "Expenditures are increasing considerably," they say there; "what about modifying the bodies of our vehicles." However, it seems, that there they do not give any thought to the idea of perfecting the transport of ore concentrates. As their moisture has been above established standards, the losses that occurred have been left on the doorsteps of the producers.

Therefore, it seems that the other side, the comrades of the Ministry of Industry and Mines deal little or not at all with this very great issue. First, there are no exact details about the losses, and no direct checking has been done to find the responsible elements. Paskal Gjinari, director of the Directorate of Finance, says: "As far as I know this problem remains. We have seen with our own eyes that the ore is lost on the way." While, Gezim Hajdini, economist at the Directorate of Mines, explains that: "This issue is an old one and that, in regard to losses, we are O.K., and so are the people in transportation" (!)

To say: "As far as I know, this problem remains," means to be very far from anxiety. We must not forget that the person who said this is the director of the Directorate of Finance who is directly responsible for the losses. The question arises: What efforts have been made and are being made to standardize the percentage of moisture, in the ore, which has reached 12, 15 and up to 20 to 25 percent? With the exception of knowing these indicators, no real action has been carried out. As a matter of fact, it is surprising that they do not even want to know about these figures. At one briefing following mutual monitoring, some months ago, with the comrades of the Ministry of Transportation, two specialists of this ministry—Lame Stoja and Halit Shpathi—refused to accept the matters and shortcomings that had been observed. Let us pause for a moment; these comrades who did not accept the material prepared, which raised great issues, did they document their suggestions? Further; those who started this monitoring process which, more or less, shows the responsibility of both sides, did they not think that it would be better for them to go to the bottom of the issue. Of course, it would be. The basic party organizations, we believe, have the duty to deal concretely with the issue.

So that losses of mineral concentrates will be averted, not only in Mirdite, but also in Puke and elsewhere, it is absolutely necessary for all those who have obligations toward them to be imbued with the feeling of high responsibility. For example, in regard to standardization of moisture percentages, responsibility and tasks devolve not only on the Ministry of Industry and Mines, but also on the General Directorate of the Machine Industry, the Mineral Studies and Design Institute and the Mineral Technological Institute. A greater share of responsibility is assigned to the latter institutes, because for a long time they have been taking upon themselves the solution of vacuum-filters defects; however, they are making it a twisted rope according to the explanation of Kosta Mirce, director of the Directorate for Machinery and Spare Parts; he, himself, and those under his jurisdictions are very far removed from their obligations, without mentioning that the cooperation between the two institutes is, so to speak, negligent if we take into consideration the worries felt in the mining centers about this issue.

Regarding the solution of this issue, which all say "is disturbing," one observes that they dealt more with letters than with real work. And, in certain cases, there

are more losses in letters that at the places where the ore is damaged. At the Ministry of Transportation, for example, people say that "losses for a 8-month period are very little," while in the mining centers they gave us figures which are three times greater. Whom to believe? The issue is that, in regard to losses of ore concentrates for export, you must not expect them to be solved through democratic work by "standing on your feet." The state organs in the districts and departments, with real aid from the party committees, we believe, should give a real solution to this issue and not, as they have done until now: "You are responsible and not me"; those attitudes are costing millions of leks to the economy, and the Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee has severely criticized them.

Efforts To Utilize Nonmetallic Minerals
21000003 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian
20 Sep 88 p 2

[Article by Vasfi Duka and Rifat Dajti: "Roads To Introduce Nonmetallic Minerals in Economic Circulation"]

[Text] As a result of interdisciplinary study and design work, in 1988 it became possible, for the first time, to utilize some new minerals for economic purposes, for example, the white sands in Tamare for the porcelain industry, fluorite from Brashte in Dukagjin for the needs of metallurgy in Elbasan, the Dardhe bauxite mine in Librazhd and, it was also decided to put into economic utilization the black and white stone for decorative purposes from Rrapsh-Stares in Shkoder, the barite for the needs of petroleum in Levrush in Puke district and so forth. The studies and experiments for introducing these mineral ores in economic utilization were made possible by the active participation of geologists, technologists, economists and foreign trade specialists.

The geological enterprise in Shkoder is obtaining experience by assuring cooperation with more than 20 economic institutes and enterprises of the country in order to expand the study and experimentation dealing with the nonmetallic mineral ores discovered in Shkoder and Lezhe districts.

This request was correctly understood and was supported by the majority of leading elements of the user combines and study and design institutes. Thus, the ISTN [Institute for Construction Technology Studies] in Tirana in its draft plan for 1989 has scheduled studies for experimenting with the possibility of producing brick and grit slabs with albite layers, of reducing the baking of bricks with albite layers, the production of decorative slabs for interior and exterior use in residences and social-cultural buildings with Gabbro Trachtolyte stones from Kashnjet and of black and white decorative stones from Rrapsh-Stares in Shkoder. In addition to those, this institute plans to experiment with the production of white and colored cement with raw materials from nonmetallic minerals discovered in Shkoder and Lezhe.

There are other examples from the chemical-metallurgical combine in Lac, the ISP [Study and Design Institute] for metallurgy and so forth, which show that the interest of those who make experiments on and use these mineral ores has been awakened; these minerals seek to win the right to citizenship in our economy. This is the reason why some user enterprises have started to conclude contracts with the geological enterprise in Shkoder.

Of course, pursuing such an example in work, such as the example of the geological enterprise in Shkoder, the Tirana enterprise and some others is also valuable for the other geological enterprises in the country, to acquaint others with their discoveries and to persist in studies and experiments in order to put these mineral ores in the service of the economy as soon as possible.

Based on studies and experiments carried out by departmental research and design institutes, in cooperation with economic, geological, mining and building enterprises, the following were commissioned on the intensive road: the mines for kalinites, of olivenites, of dolomites, of mineral salt, of decorative stones and dozens of lime quarries for the building material industry, for the ferrous metallurgy industry and the chemical plants. Also, dozens of sand quarries for the production of cement, of bricks, tiles, drain pipes and so forth.

However, based on the party recommendation that in special sectors extensive possibilities for development today and for the future are greater, with a broader examination, the utilization of mineral ores must be seen on this road.

Evaluating the improvement of lands with limited fertility in some districts, such as Kukes, Mat, Mirdite and Puke, funds have been assigned for the construction of factories for the preparation of lime minerals. However, the liming of the soil must take place every year. The experience of some agricultural cooperatives in Librazhd District, which have special squads for the burning of lime during the whole year with means found on the spot, in simple kilns according to old traditions with a capacity of 100 to 150 quintals, must be followed by others. We mention this, because it is difficult to satisfy by means of large demands for lime concentrated production on the intensive road; therefore, we feel the use of extensive roads is necessary.

Vlore, Sarande, Dures, Diber and other districts have great reserves of gypsum. Great quantities of gypsum are used for the neutralization of salty soils. The main users of gypsum are the Hoxhare, Akerni, Spitalle and Rremas agricultural cooperatives. Gypsum is ground at big production centers; it can also be ground by simple grinding machines, because it has a low strength.

The cement plants in Vlore have started to produce plaster from gypsum. These opportunities to produce great quantities of plaster for domestic consumption and

for export also exist in Sarande, Diber and Durres. This product is made possible by constructing simple kilns for the baking of gypsum with our charcoal.

In recent years, the actions for experimenting with and using clay, kaolin, montmorillonite and cementite have been greatly expanded making articles with own forces such as pottery, poles and plates produced by the innovators of the brick plants in Lushnje, Korce and elsewhere. All the opportunities exist to make this experience known and disseminated in other districts, too.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

New Containership Class Described

23000081 East Berlin SEEWIRTSCHAFT in German
Nov 88 pp 545-557

[Article by Thomas Diestel, engineer, Chamber of Technology, and Joachim Kohler, Chamber of Technology, VEB Warnow Shipyard: "Passat Class Multipurpose Containership"]

[Text] In the 1970's development of multipurpose containerships started at the Warnow shipyard. Since that time, a total of 53 ships of this type have been delivered to clients from India, Yugoslavia, France, the FRG and to the VEB Deutfracht Shipping Company in Rostock. Following the market-oriented trend of the time, the development of the newest multipurpose containership from the VEB Warnow yard has come to fruition by way of such proven series as the Meridian, Monsun and Aquator. Changes in customers' wishes, new findings from science and technology, as well as the many years of experience in the building and operation of these ships have gone into development and account for the high utility value of this type of ship.

The first ship in this series, the 322d new ship built by the yard, was delivered to a Yugoslavian shipowner on 30 October 1987. It was the 18th new ship built by the yard for a Yugoslavian customer. Three Passat-class ships have now been delivered to customers from the nonsocialist economic area, and three have gone to Yugoslavian shipping companies. Contracts are on hand for additional new ships.

The cardinal features of the Passat class ship are its high utility value, its great versatility and its customer-oriented modifiability. Acknowledging the dominant form of container transportation in international trade, the ship is particularly suited to carrying containers along with mixed cargo, in addition to grain and break-bulk cargoes. The ship is equipped with double and tween deck hatches, which makes it possible to carry different cargoes separately without any limitation on load capacity. A total of 930 TEU [Terminal Exchange Units] can be carried, and depending on customer requirements, a maximum of 100 refrigerated containers can be stacked

on the deck. The cranes mounted midships between the holds, with capacities of 25 and 40 tons, allow good onboard loading and unloading of the ship.

A bow-mounted transverse thruster gives the ship good maneuverability even in difficult sea passages. The main engine, a model 5 RTA 58 (built under license from Sulzer), develops 7,000 kW (CMCR—contract maximum continuous rating) and operates directly on a variable pitch propeller.

The emphasis during the development of this ship type was on energy-optimal and economical operation. The optimized, hydrodynamically good underwater shape, the efficient use of high-viscosity fuels for the main engine, a variable pitch propeller and a shaft-driven generator unit are among the measures taken to ensure economy.

1. Ship Design

1.1 Ship Type and Purpose

The single-screw ship with fo'c'sle and poop, with the superstructures for crew accommodation located aft, has a bulb bow and a square stern. The engine room is located aft. All four holds are equipped with tween decks and allow 20 X 40-foot containers, either 8 or 8 1/2 feet high, to be transported, in addition to grain and break-bulk cargo; holds #1 through #4 are designed for the use of grab buckets. Transportation of hazardous cargoes is possible in accordance with Chapter VII of the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) of 1974 and the IMDG [International Maritime Dangerous Goods] Code while conforming to the necessary safety regulations.

1.2 Sphere of Operation, Class, Technical Data



The ship is designed for unrestricted operation, for voyages appropriate to its class in ice-covered water, as well as for passage of the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, the St. Lawrence Seaway and the Baltic-North Sea Canal. The ships built to date meet the customary regulations for ship construction and they are classified according to the rules of Bureau Veritas (BV), Jugoregister (JR), Lloyd's Register (LR) and Germanischer Lloyd (GL).

—Class in BV: I 3/3 E CARGO SHIP, DEEP SEA, HEAVY CARGO, ICE III, ACAA, RMCA-V, AUT-MS, CS-LIST

—Class according to JR: 100 A 1 + M 1 L3 AUT 1, strengthened for heavy cargoes, cargo ship, unrestricted area of navigation, certified container stowage arrangement with CS-book.

—Class according to LR: LR + 100A 1, Ice Class 3 + LMC, UMS certified container securing arrangement, strength for heavy cargo

—Class according to GL: +100 A 4 EO 1 "STRENGTHENED FOR HEAVY CARGO," "EQUIPPED FOR CARRIAGE OF CONTAINERS," + MC O1 AUT



Principal Technical Data

Length Overall	165.5 m
Length between Perpendiculars	152.4 m
Breadth, Moulded	23.05 m
Height to the Main Deck	13.4 meters
Height to the Second Deck	9.2 meters
Freeboard Draft from the Underside of the Keel	10.07 meters
Capacity	18,235 tons
Tonnage	1,651 tons gross 7,468 tons net
Container Storage Capacity	930 TEU [Terminal Exchange Unit]
—below decks	360 TEU
—on deck	570 TEU
—refrigerated containers on deck	100 TEU maximum
Hold Capacity	
—Bulk Cargo	24,600 m ³
—Bulk Cargo	22,900 m ³
Engine Power/Revs/Min	7,000 kW/127 revs/min
Speed under Trials Conditions With a Draft T=10.07 meters (to underside) of keel,	
90 percent CMC without generator operation	16.1 knots
Operating Range	14,000 nautical miles
Crew (including pilot)	36

2. Ship Construction

2.1 Hull

The hull is fully welded and reinforced along the ice belt in conformance with its ice class. The flat and box sections making up the ship's hull are mostly mechanically UP and MAG [Metal Arc Gas Shielded] (CO₂ welded, the assembly weld seams and section butts are manually arc-welded. All plates and curved sections have been descaled by blasting them with steel shot prior to processing and subsequently precoated with corrosion protective material.

The double bottom is of combination construction. This was carried out in different ways. In the area of the engine room, frames #12 to #47, and in the bow area, frame #149 up to the bow, it is transverse frame construction with floor plates at each frame, and in the area of the forward engine room bulkhead as far as frame #150 it is side-stringer construction, using longitudinal floor reverse stringers and floor plates at each 4th frame. The container footing points are braced by side girders and floor plates or other means of support. The bed-frame for the main engine is mounted directly on reinforced baseplates of the inner bottom, which are carried by reinforced side girders. The plating of the inner bottom in holds #1 through #4 is reinforced for grab bucket operation.

Bilge wells are located at the rear edges of the holds and in the engine room. From frame #42 to frame #153 along the ship's centerline there is a pipeline which is negotiable from the engine room and from the fire-fighting pump room in the ship's bow.

The outer skin is stiffened with flat-bulb or built-up stay and web curved sections as frames. To stiffen side strength and to brace the deck, support bulkheads are located in holds #2 through #4 in the area of the container faces, which support a stringer deck in the side ballast tanks 5,400 mm above base. This reduces the span width and consequently also the cross section of the hold frames.

The hull is divided by six watertight main bulkheads. The bulkheads for the high tanks between holds #2 and #3, #3 and #4 and the bulkhead on frame #44 above No 2 deck are designed as folding bulkheads with vertical folds. In holds #2 through #4, between No 2 deck and the main deck, there is a centerline bulkhead, also constructed as a folding bulkhead with openings for forklifts to pass through. The main deck, like the No 2 deck, is supported by the continuous box-section girder of No 2 deck, in conjunction with the central longitudinal bulkhead and the box-section girder which is formed by the continuous hatch coaming for holds #2 through #4 and the main deck. The outer coamings are supported by the transverse bulkheads and by bracing bulkheads on the ship's sides. The main deck has no sheer and in the area from the rear edge of hatch #4 to the forward edge of hatch #2 it is built with a round of 100 mm next to the hatches. Bulkheads, walls, engine casing, load-bearing inner walls, the rear and side walls of the aft deckhouse and the walls of the deckhouse on the main deck are stiffened as much as possible with corrugations.

2.2 General Equipment

The anchor and warping equipment on the bow consists of two automatic electric warping winches with gypsy

heads and attached anchor section, in which the anchor section can be separated by a coupling. The pull capacity of the cable is 125 kN. The two anchors in the outer hull hawse pipes and the spare anchor are Gruson anchors, each weighing 6,000 kg. The high-strength steel anchor chains are 68 mm in diameter and are 275 meters (port) and 302.5 meters (starboard) in length. Additional equipment consists of two anchor lashings, two chain guide rollers and two chain slips which can be operated from the fo'c'sle deck. The anchor and warping equipment on the stern consists of two automatic electric winches with gypsy heads, with the port side winch having the cable lifter for the stern anchor. The Gruson stern anchor weighs 3,060 kg. The anchor chain, which is also high-strength steel, is 40 mm in diameter and 440 meters long.

Other warping equipment, such as bollards, hawse holes, bitts and guide rollers are designed in conformance with the regulations for individual sea passages and are available in the requisite numbers.

The rudder is a welded construction, streamlined, semi-floating rudder. It is supported by the rudder post, which is manufactured as a forged piece and operated by an electro-hydraulic, twin-cylinder differential piston servo unit with a rated moment of 235 kN on the rudder post. The transverse bow thruster produces 740 kW of power and has a thrust of 112 kN.

On each side of the ship, at the boat deck level, is the launching equipment for a motor lifeboat. The lifeboats are enclosed, built of fiberglass reinforced polyester and are self-righting. Each one is equipped for 40 persons. Additional life saving equipment consists of two floats for 20 persons on each side of the ship, with a launching chute on the boat deck, a float for 8 persons on the boat deck and various life-saving devices such as flotation collars, suits and lifebelts.

There is also a work boat on the captain's deck with a stern drive engine and a work float, with can be swung out using a 2.5-ton hydraulic crane.

2.3 Cargo Handling Equipment and Hatch Covers

A total of three cranes between holds #1 and #2, #2 and #3 is available for onboard cargo handling. On one of the most recently built ships the following arrangement of cranes was provided for the Yugoslavian shipping company:

- between holds #1 and #2: Type G 2524 single ship's whipping crane, with a 25-ton capacity and 24-meter reach;
- between holds #2 and #3: Type G 2526 double ship's whipping crane, capacity 2 X 25 tons, reach 26 meters;
- between holds #3 and #4: Type G 4028 single ship's whipping crane, capacity 40 tons, reach 28 meters.

All the cranes were built by the May 3rd company under license from the Hagglund company in the Socialist Free Republic of Yugoslavia. Access to the operator's cabin is through the derrick masts. The jibs are made fast at sea above the fourth layer of on-deck containers on suitable rests. The cranes are equipped both for break-bulk cargo and container transportation.

For loading the deck containers onto the boat deck there is a light cargo boom on the starboard side of the captain's deck with a capacity of 5 tons. To service the engine casing and the provisions shaft and to sway out the work boat and the work float there is a crane on each side of the ship on the captain's deck with a capacity of 2.5 tons.

Cargo hatches #1 through #4 have hydraulically operated folding covers on the weather deck and the tween deck. The hatches on the open deck are watertight and have no pitch, the tween deck hatches are not watertight and are of flush deck construction. The permissible container loads for the folding covers on the open deck are:

—for hatch #1: 20/30 kN/m² (for 20- and 40-foot containers)

—for hatch #2 through #4: 45/65 kN/m²

and those for the tween deck hatch covers in holds #1 through #4: 40/60 kN/m².

Hatch dimensions (in mm):

—Hatch #1 (tab)(tab) 12,650 X 10,400

—Hatch #2 and #3 (tab) 25,300 X 7,800

—Hatch #4 (tab)(tab) 19,200 X 7,800

Emergency opening of the hatch covers is carried out by reversing the hydraulic circuits. Seaworthy securing on the open deck is carried out by means of manually operated quick fasteners located around the edge.

2.4 Container Transportation

Planned container stowage on the open deck is as follows:

- on hatch #1 two layers;
- next to hatch #1, on the starboard side of the open deck, two layers;
- on hatches #2 through #4, four layers, the third and fourth layers being empty containers;
- between hatches #1 and #2, #2 and #3, #3 and #4, #4 and the crew accommodation, four layers;
- on the boat deck, three layers.

There are electrical outlets between the hatches for holds #2, #3 and #4 for the refrigerated containers which can be carried on the open deck.

On the weather deck, hatch cover insert plates are placed to act as container tracks to accept twist-lock latches. A total of 247 40-foot containers and 76 20-foot containers or 570 20-foot containers can be stacked on the open deck. In holds #2 and #4 there is the option of stacking five layers with the tween deck hatches open, or 2 X 2 layers with the tween hatches closed. Taking the requirements of the classifying agents as a basis, the containers in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th, or 2nd and 4th layers have horizontal braces to the ship's sides. In holds #2 forward and #4 aft, in the area where the ship's sides draw in, removable bracing frames are provided. In holds #1 through #4, with the tween deck hatches open, a total of 132 40-foot containers and 30 20-foot containers or 294 20-foot containers can be stacked.

2.5 Fittings

Fittings are adapted to customers' different wishes. The following living accommodations are available for the crew, which consists of 36 persons including the pilot:

- 4 suites with working, sleeping and toilet facilities for staff officers,
- 19 single-berth cabins with separate toilet facilities for officers, non-commissioned officers and crew,
- 6 single-berth cabins with toilet facilities for every 2 cabins for the crew,
- 3 twin-berth cabins for crew with toilet facilities.

The mess complex consists of a galley, preparation and storage rooms, in addition to the officers, crew and watch messes. There are day rooms for the officers and the crew in their time off, a sports area and a swimming pool. A hospital is available for medical care, with a treatment room, a drug store and toilet facilities. Offices and equipment rooms of the requisite size and number are provided in proportion to their functional importance.

The vertical corridor and dividing walls of the living area are made from 50-mm thick, non-flammable and sound-absorbing wall units conforming to standardized installation system 50 (SOLAS Type B-15). The walls are covered on both sides with organically coated sheet steel (0.75 mm thick). The ceilings for the cabins, the messes, the lounges and service rooms are made of lacquer-coated sheet metal units with mineral-wool insulation, and they meet SOLAS Type B-O requirements for dividing walls.

The furnishings in the rooms and their arrangement and design are intended to promote the well being of the crew on board and are in line with the yard's proven solid standard.

2.6 Ventilation and Air Conditioning

Two dual channel group air-conditioning systems were chosen to provide climate control for the living quarters and lounges, the radio room, the hospital and the offices. The system supplies cold and warm air to 16 groups of rooms, which are made up of between 2 and 5 areas with equal or similar thermal loads. From this spot, blended warm and cold air reaches individual rooms independently of their thermal loads. The system assures conditioning of the rooms at outside temperatures from -20° C to 35° C.

Performance data for one system:

- Cooling capacity 152 kilowatts
- Total heating capacity 104 kilowatts
- Humidification 51 kg/hour
- Volume of air 6,000 m³/hour

Two independent air-conditioning units were installed to take care of the engine control room. All the toilet facilities are artificially vented and their intake air comes from adjacent areas, corridors or from outside. The utility rooms, as well as the galleys and adjacent areas, the laundry, drying and ironing room and some equipment rooms are provided with artificial intake and exhaust air, with preheating provided in various degrees for winter operation. Air exchange meets accepted standards. The refrigerated provisions rooms receive natural ventilation from the anterior rooms by way of ventilation hatches in the refrigeration area doors, as well as by means of forced air extraction. Dust filters can be installed during port operations.

The engine room, the workshops and the ancillary engine room areas have forced air extraction, and intake air is preheated when required. Four axial fans, one of which is reversible, supply the engine room with approximately 130,000 m³ of air per hour. Forced air extraction has been designed in for the diesel generator room, the fuel separator room, the shafting area, the emergency diesel room, as well the stores and the injector test room.

3. Mechanical Engineering

3.1 Engine Room

The engine room is located aft. The main and emergency engines are positioned mainly in stowage and the two decks above it. All the operating tanks and special rooms for the engine installations are housed in the area from the inner bottom to the main deck, with the exception of

the garbage incinerator and the emergency diesel generator. The steam generator is located on the main deck and above it in the engine casing. The emergency exit shaft is located on the forward engine room bulkhead—clear cross section 800 X 800 mm—with access through self-closing doors from the ship's bottom in stowage and the engine room in the 2nd deck, with an exit onto the main deck. The diesel generator room and the refrigerator room also have a common exit shaft from the 2nd deck to the main deck.

The necessary lifting equipment is available in the engine room and the workshops to perform repair and maintenance work. The spare parts platform on the forward engine casing wall is within the operating range of the engine room crane (capacity 3.2 tons). The workshop and store area is on the same level, and the machine room with a lathe, drilling and grinding equipment. Replacement parts can be transported through a hatch in the captain's deck (2.4 m X 3.5 m) using onboard equipment for transfer to the engine room where they can be picked up by the engine room crane.

3.2 Main Engines

The main engine is a single-acting, reversible, long-stroke, two-stroke, cross-head diesel engine, with parallel scavenging and positively actuated exhaust valves. It is a Type 5 RTA 58, built under license from Sulzer by the VEB Dieselmotorenwerk Rostock. Supercharging is carried out by a NA 57 exhaust-driven turbocharger, built under license from MAN B & W. It is mounted on consoles on the starboard side of the engine at the level of the cylinders. The turbocharger is assisted during engine startup and in the lower load range by two electrically driven auxiliary blowers which are mounted on the front of the engine. The auxiliary blowers are switched on and off independently of scavenge air pressure. The engine is set up to operate on heavy oil up to a viscosity of 460 mm²/sec at 323 K from pier to pier. The CMCR power selected is 7,000 kilowatts at 127 revs/min. Optimal fuel consumption—in reference to the CMCR rating, a lower caloric value of 42,707 kJ/kg and meeting ISO standard requirements—is 172g/kilowatts per hour + three percent.

The main engine and shafting are rigidly linked and inclined about 0.9 degrees to the stern from base. Propeller thrust is taken up by the thrust bearing built into the main engine. The shafting is carried in the rear bushing of the stern tube and in two tunnel bearings. The forward of the two intermediate shafts carries the shaft generator transmission, the rear shaft carries the hydraulic adjusting unit and the hydraulic cylinder for the variable pitch propeller. The propeller blades are adjusted hydraulically by means of the hydraulic cylinder through the pushrod which is carried in the hollow-bored propeller shaft. The position of the hydraulic

piston is controlled by the hydraulic adjusting unit. Propeller pitch is set remotely. If the hydraulic unit fails, the current propeller pitch is blocked, and it can be adjusted manually.

Remote control of the engine is carried out from the bridge by means of a single-lever combination joystick, operating either under joystick control or at fixed engine speed. Under joystick operation optimal revolutions, fuel injection and pitch inputs are assigned to the particular rates of speed. During operation at constant revolutions, which is mandatory while the shaft generator is in use, joystick operation is reduced to pure pitch control. Remote control from the engine room is carried out by means of a 2-lever operation for revs/min and pitch. The engine itself has the customary control platform.

3.3. Transverse Thruster

To improve maneuverability, the ship is equipped with a Type QRV 200 transverse thruster, manufactured by the VEB Dieselmotorenwerk, Rostock. It is installed in the bow, behind the collision bulkhead, and the transverse thrust needed is generated by a variable pitch propeller. The propeller is driven by an electric motor through an flexible pin coupling and a transmission. The motor is located on a baseplate on the lateral tube, the transverse thruster transmission with the variable pitch propeller is in the transverse tube. The propeller blades can be set continuously to any pitch from "Full Starboard" to "Full Port." Setting the pitch is carried out hydraulically by remote control without reversing the electric motor. If the remote control malfunctions, it is possible to adjust the propeller manually. Power output is about 740kW, thrust generated ranges from 0 to + 112 kN - 3 percent.

3.4 Generating Equipment

There are three diesel generator powerplants, a shaft-driven generator and an emergency diesel generator. Each diesel generator consists of a Type 8 VDS 26/20 AL-2 turbocharged four-stroke, plunger piston diesel engine, producing 774 kilowatts at 1,000 revs/min (manufacturer: VEB Schwermaschinen Karl Liebknecht in Magdeburg) and a direct-current generator. The engine and the generator are attached to a common frame and flexibly mounted.

The diesel generators are equipped with exhaust-gas turbochargers, intercoolers and lubricating oil coolers. The intake air and oil are cooled with sea water, the cylinders are cooled with fresh water. Electrically powered lubricating pumps provide prelubrication. The diesel generators are operated primarily with heavy oil of about 100 mm²/sec at 323 K and they can be run using this in stand-by operation. MDF [Marine Diesel Fuel] of about 9.5 mm²/sec is the intended second fuel. Separate supply systems are installed for both fuels, with pumps,

heat exchangers and high containers. The generating equipment, including the auxiliary systems, are located in a partially sound-insulated space on the 2nd deck.

The shaft-driven generator transmission (manufacturer: VEB Dieselmotorenwerk, Rostock) transmits part of the main engine's power to operate the shaft-driven generator, simultaneously increasing rpm from 127 revs/min to 1,000 revs/min. The main gear of the transmission is shrunk onto one of the two intermediate shafts of the shafting. The transmission does not have a baseplate of its own and is supported on the shafting and the torque mount. Gearbox and generator are linked by a highly elastic clutch, which allows the generator to be switched on and off. The pumps and the heat exchanger for the transmission lubricating oil system are built onto the transmission casing.

A Type 4 VD 21/15-1 turbocharged four-stroke, plunger piston diesel engine (manufacturer: VEB Dieselmotorenwerk, Leipzig), producing 77 kW at 1,000 revs/min, provides the power for the emergency generator. The diesel engine operates on gas oil. Cooling is by fresh water, with return cooling by means of a forced air fan in the honeycomb radiator. The diesel engine is started automatically with an electric starter from a battery. Electric hand starting or the use of compressed air is also possible.

3.5 Steam Generator Plant

Steam is generated by boiler equipment consisting of a Type ESH 2.5 oil-fired single-drum water-tube boiler, producing 2.5 tons of steam per hour, and a Type AKS 1.8-24 spiral-tube exhaust gas boiler, producing about 1.6 tons of steam per hour at a main engine intake air temperature of 45° C and separate steam drum. The boiler manufacturer is the VEB Dampfkesselbau Dresden-Übigau. In port and during river passages, steam is supplied by the auxiliary boiler, at cruising speed, at a main engine output above 70 percent, it is supplied from the exhaust gas boiler. In parallel operation the auxiliary boiler cuts in automatically if pressure in the exhaust gas boiler falls below a certain level. The main burner in the auxiliary boiler runs on heavy oil of the same viscosity as the main engine, the ignition burner runs on gas oil.

3.6 Compressed Air Equipment

Two starting air containers (each holding 5 m³) and a single starting container (0.25m³) are provided for the main engine, the auxiliary boiler and other loads. There are two primary air compressors and an auxiliary compressor, with outputs of 150 m³/hour each and 3.2 MPa and 63 m³/hour and 3.2 MPa respectively, two-stage, vertical construction, with fresh water cooling and an attached water pump. The compressors are switched on automatically, depending on the pressure in the tanks. Initial startup of the electrical energy system is carried out with the help of the auxiliary compressor and the emergency diesel generator.

3.7 Fuel and Lubricating Oil Supply

Three type of fuel are carried on board to operate the engines, heavy oil of 460 mm²/second at 323 K, MDF of about 9.5 mm² at 323 K and a small amount of gas oil for special consumers. Two settling tanks are provided for good precleaning of the heavy oil, each designed for 26 hours of operation with the main engine operating at its maximum rated power, with sharply sloping floors for better desedimentation. The heavy oil day tank is designed the same way. The day tank and the settling tank are sealed off to the outer skin. Fuel is constantly separated from one of the settling tanks into the day tank. The excess fuel flows back into the settling tank. One settling tank and one day tank are provided for the MDF, gas oil is separated directly from the supply tank into the operating tank. There are two heavy oil and one MDF Type MAPX 309 separator in the fuel separator room, self-cleaning, with an attached feed system and a separate supply pump. The heavy oil separators can be operated in parallel and in series. The MDF separator is the reserve for the heavy oil separators.

From heavy oil at 460 mm²/sec at 323 K and MDF heavy oil of about 100 mm²/sec at 323 K is mixed in a fuel mixer for the diesel generators in the generating plant. The mixed and homogenized oil blend is pumped from the mixer into a buffer container with a capacity of about 0.8 m³ and from here it is brought by the supply pumps to the diesel generators. The container is topped up automatically, depending on the consumption of the mixing machine.

Lubricating oil for the main engine is cleaned in the ancillary circuit by one of the two MAPX 207 lubricating oil separators (self-cleaning, with attached feed equipment and a separate supply pump). At intervals, the other one performs the separation of the lubricating oil for the auxiliary diesel and it is the reserve for the main engine's lubricating oil separator. All the separators are produced in the People's Republic of Poland under license from Alfa-Laval.

3.8 Disposal Equipment

To ensure the requisite protection for the environment and to meet the regulations pertaining to it, the ship is equipped with the following equipment:

- a SAVA 75/50 garbage incinerator, suitable for incinerating solid waste, used oil and sedimented oil from the separators.

- a TE Si bilgewater deoiler with a TF 5 filter on the discharge side, which can pass 5 m³/hour. The combination deoiler-filter ensures a purity of a maximum of 15 grams oil/liter of cleansed water and is in conformance with the MARPOL requirements of 1973-78.

- a waste water treatment plant based on the principle of waste water breakdown through aerobic action. Before the waste water treated in this way is discharged overboard it is additionally passed through a chlorination plant and an ultra-violet light sterilization plant.

—permanent ships tanks of adequate size to hold the accumulated oil residue, dirty and used oil and the various waste waters until they can be treated or discharged.

3.9 Pipes and Systems

The cooling system is supplied with sea cooling water through a high chest and a deep sea chest in the engine room. Engines and powerplants are cooled with fresh water, using sea water for return cooling. Lubricating oil and charge air intercooling for the main engine and the auxiliary diesels is carried out with sea water. Cylinder cooling for the main engine and the auxiliary diesels, piston cooling in the main engine and cooling of the air compressors is performed with fresh cooling water through separate systems.

The central compressed air system supplies all on-board loads, such as the main engine, the diesel generators, emergency diesel generators, foghorn, soot blower, CO2 station, automatic separators, tools, regulators, blowout pipes, etc. with compressed air. The fuel lines for heavy oil are designed as a single-pipe system and are equipped with steam trace heating. The steam pipes for heating the tube bank preheaters and the steam fire extinguishing system are designed for an operating pressure of 0.5 to 0.8 MPa, those for space heating, tank heating and steaming out the tanks are designed for a pressure of 0.3 MPa.

The condensate system is divided into a separate collection system

- for oil-free condensate,
- for condensate suspected of containing oil, to which the tube bank preheaters for lubricating oil and fuel are attached,
- for condensate suspected of containing oil, to which the tank heating for the fuel and oil tanks and the bilge water tank is attached.

The ship's bilge and ballast system is designed as a single-pipe system. The bilge pipe is in the pipeline and the main line for the ballast tank is located next to the pipeline in the double bottom. The remote-operated armatures for the bilge and ballast system, which are located in the pipeline are operated centrally from a switch box in the engine control room. The ship's heeling compensation system works automatically or manually from the ship's office on the poop deck.

Water supply is maintained through a drinking water system and a clean fresh water system. Both drinking water and clean fresh water are disinfected with ultra-violet sterilization plants.

The water fire-fighting system is used for fighting fires in the living and utility area, in the engine room, on the open deck and in the bow area. Two fire pumps are available in the engine room and an emergency fire pump forward. The CO2 fire-fighting system is intended for fighting fires in the holds, in the engine room, the emergency diesel room, the paint locker and in the trash incinerator room.

4. Electrical Equipment

4.1 Onboard Electrical System

A 380 volt, 50 Hertz insulated 3-conductor layout is installed as the principal onboard electrical system. The neutral point for the generators and transformers is not connected with the ship's hull.

The following voltages and current types are available:

- 380 volts, 3-phase, 50 Hz for power loads and refrigerated containers
- 220 volts, 3-phase, 50 Hz for lighting, heating, utility loads, portable repair lighting
- 42 volts, single-phase alternating current for portable tools and repair lighting
- 24 volts, direct current for battery circuits, fire alarm system and engine monitoring equipment.

Loads are supplied with power through a grid directly from the main switchboard, the emergency switchboard or through relays or subcircuits.

4.2 Power Supply

There are two alternatives available on board ship for supplying all loads with electrical energy, depending on the ship's state of operation. During "operation at sea," at constant main engine revolutions and therefore of the variable pitch propeller shaft, the entire demand for electrical energy is met by a Type DGASO 5621-6 shaft-driven generator, with an output of 1,250 kVA (1,000 kilowatts), at 3890 volts and 50 Hertz. The alternating current, 3-phase, constant voltage generator, with a slip ring and electronic energizer system, current-compounded, is driven by the propeller shaft through a transmission and an electro-pneumatic clutch at a speed of 1,000 revs/min.

During operations "Maneuvering with Transverse Thruster" it is possible to feed in the shaft generator for the transverse thruster in island operation through a circuit in the collector rail system in the main switchboard. In this case the ship's electrical system is supplied by the diesel generators. In all other modes of operation which preclude the use of the shaft-driven generator, all loads are supplied by means of three S 450 L 6 brushless alternating current constant voltage generators, which

are driven by three 8 VDS 26/20 AL-2 diesel engines. The generators are equipped with electrical regulators and are current compounded. The output of one generating plant is 890 kVA (712 kiloHertz) at a speed of 1,000 revs/min. All three generators are designed for full-time operation in parallel with one another. The generators' outputs are regulated in such a way that one generator needs to be running for the electrical system without the refrigerated containers, and two are needed with refrigerated containers, while the third one is always available in reserve. If the diesel generators are overloaded, individual loads are switched off automatically on a time-delay basis.

During layovers in port or a shipyard it is possible to have current supplied by means of a shore connection (380 volt, 3-phase, 50 Hertz up to 400 amps). If the main current supply is interrupted, an emergency diesel powerplant with an output of 80 kVA (64 Kilowatts) provides emergency power for the ship. The S 250 M6 brushless, 3-phase constant voltage generator is driven by a 4 VD 21/15-1 diesel engine. The powerplant is started automatically from the main switchboard by an electric starter, fed by a 24-volt battery, if there is a drop in voltage in the feed to the emergency switchboard.

4.3 Automation Equipment

The scope of the automation system allows unattended engine operation for 24 hours when sailing at sea and while maneuvering in accordance with its supplementary class designation and unattended auxiliary engine operation during layovers in port. The supervision and operations rooms for ship's engine operation are on the bridge deck and in the engine control room (MKR). The following equipment is available on the bridge to monitor and run the ship's engine system:

- a section for automated remote control of the main engine and the variable pitch propeller from the bridge with remote control head (combined with the engine telegraph head),
- operating and signal indicator board and displays for propeller shaft speed and propeller blade pitch,
- the central signal indicator board for visual and audible collective reporting of engine malfunctions,
- signal equipment for bilge, ballast and fuel valves,
- fire warning control room,
- maneuver printer.

These components of the monitoring board are in the engine control room:

- remote control displays (shaft speed, pitch) for the main propulsion unit,

- engine telegraph acknowledgement receiver,
 - operating and report board for the remote control of the main propulsion unit,
 - operating and report board for the main and auxiliary engines,
 - electronic regulators for the engine systems,
 - displays for the most important operating parameters,
 - equipment for visual and audible signaling of malfunctions,
 - indicator board for centralized signals for special and collective reports,
 - service hours counter
- and various control panels for the
- remote control equipment for the main engine and variable pitch propeller,
 - generating equipment,
 - overlapping engine monitoring system (Ursadat),
 - stand-by pump control,
 - pitch control for the transverse thruster.

The engine control room is sound-insulated and air-conditioned. An overlapping (complex) engine monitoring system is used to centrally monitor the ship's engine operation. Monitoring of the most important operating parameters in the engine installations for the upper and/or lower limits is carried out by an Ursadat 4110 monitor. An Ursadat 4120 temperature monitor monitors adherence to the upper values and deviations from the average readings of the exhaust temperature of each individual cylinder in the main engine. The maneuver log is kept automatically by an Ursadat 4150 maneuver recording machine. All recorded data are printed every 4 hours on a strip printer, during maneuvers or when selected manually.

A viscosity regulator controls the viscosity of the heavy oil for the main engine. The temperature of the cooling water and lubricating oil for the main engine and of the sea cooling water for the main and auxiliary engine is controlled by electronic temperature regulators. Direct operating temperature regulators are used for the auxiliary systems, tanks and containers. In the event of a loss of pressure in a particular system or if there is a malfunction, automatic standby pump switches take care of turning on the reserve pumps.

Additional features of automated ship's engine operation are: —programmed control for fuel and oil separators,

—automated compressed air equipment,

—automatic controls for starting, stopping and monitoring the diesel generators with black-out programming,

—fuel mixer for heavy oil operation of the diesel generators,

—automated steam generating equipment with auxiliary and exhaust heat boilers,

—bilge water deoiling equipment with monitoring of residual oil content.

4.4 Radio, Navigation and Reporting Equipment

The radio, navigation and transmitting equipment meets current requirements for modern (sailing). In addition to the conventional functional equipment such as:

—multi-band transmitter,

—ESB [Single-Side-Band] traffic receiver,

—emergency radio with transmitter and receiver, emergency distress signal transmitter and automatic SOS signal receiver,

—intermediate band receiver,

—weather map writer,

—radio telephone,

—portable lifeboat radio station and

—VHF radio telephone,

the ship also has a modern satellite communications system. In conjunction with the existing satellite navigator it offers particular advantages, not only for navigating the ship, but it increases the ship's availability particularly for container transportation by a constant radio link between any locations on land and at sea.

The following pieces of equipment are installed to navigate the ship and monitor the voyage:

—2 radar sets, one of which is an S-band, ARPA unit,

—gyro compass,

—satellite navigation system,

—radio direction finding,

—echograph,

—doppler log unit.

The following installations are used for signalling, issuing orders and reporting:

—two-way intercom system,

—operating telephone,

—traffic telephone,

—radio and television,

—overlapping alarm system,

—fire alarm system

—CO₂ gas warning system.

HUNGARY

Diversified Bond Market to Test Investor Attitudes

25000100a Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 21 Jan 89 pp 69-71

[Article by Gyorgyi Kocsis: "Bond Sales to Individuals ("To the Population"): Market Redistribution"]

[Excerpt] The new agreement reached by banks last week concerning the sale of securities demands more responsible conduct on part of financial institutions. The agreement goes into effect this week. The question is, however, whether customer service will deteriorate. Although the seemingly unified bond market we had thus far was declared to have been broken up, we will at least find out whether business policies are better adjusted to the the Hungarian investor's viewpoint.

"Whoever wants to eat well should buy stocks. Whoever wants to sleep well should buy bonds." This is the good advice given by financial experts in many places throughout the world. And the advice may be true, but not now, and not in Hungary. Namely, enough excitement is provided to bond holders if they watch securities market developments in Hungary.

The last major change in this regard took place a week ago, albeit the signs of consolidation will have appeared by the publication date of this paper. As it became known (HVG 14 Jan 88) in the first week of January, banks involved in selling bonds to the population— the Investment and Sales Subsidiary Bank, the Budapest Bank (BB), the Construction Industry Innovation Bank (EIB), the Hungarian Credit Bank (MHB) the Mercantile Bank, the National Commercial and Credit Bank (OKHB) as well as the National Savings Bank (OTP) have discontinued quoting on bonds jointly—a practice they followed since last May. After several warnings, and failed attempts to negotiate, the BB "exploded" the situation. Satisfied with the idea that most of the expense incurred in secondary sales will be born by the BB, it

announced on 9 January a future willingness to repurchase only those bonds which were issued by the BB. Many signs indicate that following a period of constrained coexistence, a majority of the banks could hardly wait to travel their own path. Thus it presented no particular difficulty for financial institutions to finalize a securities trade agreement. The agreement is valid until 30 June 1989.

The main purpose of the new structure developed with the help of the Securities Sales Secretariat is to force banks to conduct themselves in a more responsible manner, and through such conduct to permit a more even distribution of the advantages and burdens of trading. This includes the discontinuation of the practice by which some banks make high profits on administrative agreements reached with bond issuing enterprises, then flood the market with these securities in an "unbridled" manner, but then refuse to repurchase those securities claiming technical difficulties or prices which in the bank's opinion are too high. Although a larger part of bond holders generally holds on to these papers until they mature, it is obvious that the essence of all securities is that they are redeemable by the owner—even if at a minor loss—at any time, even prior to maturity date. This is what the securities market is for. But if continuity in trading stumbles, or "gets clogged" perhaps, it is understandable that investors will lose confidence in this form of savings. On the other hand, enterprises in need of new capital and intent of issuing bonds will be seeking new bond holders in vain. At the same time it is understood that the continuity of trading and the maintenance of market liquidity must not be the responsibility of any one organization.

Accordingly, the present agreement between the banks links rights and duties, and states that financial institutions involved in the issuance of bonds are obligated to quote current prices on bonds they issued, and are further obligated to trade at prices they have established, i.e. to buy and sell on demand. Accordingly, each bank is the market director, the manager of bonds in the issuance of which it was involved. If they so desire, each bank may also quote on "alien" bonds, i.e. bonds, the issuance of which was administered by other banks, but such bonds may not be sold for less than what the bank which administered the issuance of the bond would redeem it for. Accordingly, there is no opportunity for so-called arbitrage transactions, meaning that a person could purchase bonds at one place at a lower price, than sell such bonds at a higher price at a place where they are obligated to redeem such bonds.

All these constraints apply to transactions between banks and private parties. The market will be free on bond exchange days—at meetings to be held every Tuesday by the banks. More accurately defined, on bond exchange days banks may quote to each other so-called premium prices which differ from the "external" market prices. Thereafter each bank is obligated to buy bonds it manages from other banks, if such bonds are offered for sale,

at the premium price, (and quite naturally, must sell such bonds at the premium price in response to an offer to buy.) The agreement sets a limit, however, on how low the premium price may be established. This is understandable: in the absence of such limitation it could easily occur that a bank quotes on purpose a low premium price for the bonds it manages so that another bank which bought alien bonds from its clients would prefer not to redeem those bonds at the managing bank unless it was prepared to suffer a substantial loss as a result of the transaction.

In the interest of avoiding sudden, large-scale shocks the agreement prescribes that in the course of trading between banks the bank managing a certain bond issue is obligated to trade up to a maximum of 5 percent of the issuing value of the traded bond at any one time. The banking partners also agreed that the new rules would apply only to transactions consummated after the 31 December 1988 inventory taken by the various banks. At the moment, all these built-in safety features favor the interests of the Investment Bank and the OKHB, both of which were reluctant to redeem bonds thus far. Both banks were concerned that alien bonds accumulated at the BB would, in some way, by way of a detour return to them.

Based on all of the above, what changes will the bond holder face? Several changes, and on top, both favorable and unfavorable changes as compared to the situation which existed before. Insofar as current prices are concerned: initial statements suggest that at last banks will be able to find out which bank has a better insight into the heads and hearts of investors. The BB and the OTP intend to continue their harmonized business policies pursued before: to maintain the current value of bonds under their management at relatively high levels, and to preferably increase their yield through interest premiums. According to what they have promised, these two financial institutions will be willing to redeem from clients each others' bonds at current prices quoted by the managing bank. Thereafter the two banks will exchange the alien bonds they redeemed. Gradually the BB will quote current levels also for other alien bonds. This will mean that the BB will buy and sell such alien bonds in order to retain its clientele.

One may expect to see the opposite of these policies at the Investment Bank and at the OKHB. Both banks feel that bond yields which are competitive within the savings industry (i.e. 14-17 percent yields) may be offered more advantageously by keeping current prices low. Compared to earlier practice the current prices of bonds managed by these two banks are likely to drop by 2-4 percent, and will stabilize at the 90 percent level. But neither the Investment Bank nor the OKHB will run head on into the wall—at least this is suggested by the fact that by now they too wish to take advantage of the power to attract provided by interest premiums. Moreover, they will also give up some of their own profits: they will drop the margin—the difference between the

buying price and the selling price—from two percent down to one percent. At the same time both banks announced that they did not wish to trade alien bonds as long as the BB maintains its high current price policy, because such trading would not make real sense from the standpoint of the Investment Bank and the OKHB. In this way, however, the Investment Bank and the OKHB will forgo the opportunity of someone selling to them alien (e.g. BB) bonds and purchase in lieu bonds managed by the Investment Bank or the OKHB.

From among the existing approximately 350 bond issues 19 do not have managers as of press time. Sixteen of these were issued a long time ago with Hungarian National Bank [MNB] involvement, subsequently transferred to the General Entrepreneurial Bank (AVB) and became a depressing inheritance. AVB officials feel that since their institution does not intend to engage in transactions involving the population, and since at any rate they do not have a network of offices, they will not become a party to the agreement reached by the banks. Based on these considerations they are likely to contract with some other financial institution soon, for that institution to assume management of AVB bonds. (We must add here: the old MNB bonds do not designate the bank which assumed management of these bonds. At best this can be found out from the current price list.)

Since the market has broken up, and each bank trades only its own bond issues, the fact that investors must watch for which bank manages which bond, and that they must buy and sell certain bonds only at banks which manage specific bonds will be an unpleasant experience.

Nevertheless the situation is not as bad as it appears at first sight. Considering the fact that the lion share of the bond market is dominated by the BB and the OTP which cooperate with each other, and that on a nationwide scale the BB has 19 and the OTP has 500 offices, while the OKHB will trade its 60 bond issues in 50 offices, and the Investment Bank will trade its 35 securities in the 23 offices managed by the MHB, most bond holders will not need to travel a lot. It is likely that crowding experienced in significant interest paying periods of the BB will be also reduced.

Obtaining information concerning current prices, however, may cause concern. Under the new system the banks have abandoned the current price cycle system which was valid from Tuesday to the following Monday. Henceforth the valid current prices and premium prices will be announced on Tuesday's bond exchange for the following week (from Wednesday at 8 AM until 4 PM on the following Tuesday). Disregarding the current price list, it is questionable for the time being to what extent the newspapers which publish the current prices of bonds—among them HVG—will be able to adapt to the schedule established by the banks. (We apologize to our readers, for this reason the bond current price table was omitted from this issue of HVG.)

The struggle of the Hungarian bond market with its environment, inexperience and the undeveloped state of its institutional system will hardly come to an end at a time when it is only a promise that the papers officially establishing the Hungarian Securities Exchange will be sealed this year. In any event, the fact that banks are trying to learn from fiascos should raise hopes. The extension of the forward looking elements of the present agreement between the banks, and primarily that of the institution of bond issue management to trading in stocks involving the population—a matter which certainly will become a reality sooner or later—maybe perceived as a signal to raise such hopes. [passage omitted]

YUGOSLAVIA

Statistics on Increasing Nationwide Unemployment

28000061 Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA
in Serbo-Croatian 26 Dec 88 p 30

[Article by V. Karakasevic: "Employment: Behind the Crisis"]

[Text] With the mounting crisis in the Yugoslav economy the burden of excess employees is weighing ever heavier on associated labor organizations, especially because of the increasing difficulties in providing funds for individual incomes. The situations are now rare in which the problem of this burden is solved by establishing an actual technological surplus and releasing or transferring unneeded workers, or by shaping the personnel employment structure in accordance with the technological and economic needs of the particular associated labor organization. For the time being the difficulties are being moderated in most enterprises by discontinuing hiring or by reducing hiring to the minimum to fill vacant positions needed for production processes and operations.

At the end of September, 6,747,800 persons were employed in the public sector in Yugoslavia, 0.2 percent fewer than during the same month in 1987. There were 5,589,300 employees in economic activities (0.4 percent fewer than a year earlier), and 1,158,500 in noneconomic activities (0.7 percent more than in September 1987).

Of the total 70 sectors of the economy, the number of employees was lower in 40 than a year earlier. For the first time there was a decline in employment in industry and mining as a whole (by 0.3 percent), the number of workers decreasing in 24 of the total of 36 sectors. Employment also dropped in forestry, water resource management, construction, in some communications sectors, individual housing construction and public utility activities, in insurance agencies, design organizations, geological research, and business services.

In the category of public-sector activities there were 448,100 employees in the area of education and culture in September, 1.1 percent more than in 1987, while employment declined in universities and certain specific educational establishments, as it also did in physical education and athletics. Health care and social welfare employed 442,100 persons, 1.8 percent more than last year, and government agencies and organizations 285,300 or 1.4 percent fewer than in September 1987.

For the moment there are no obvious definite patterns and connections between rise or fall of employment and the economic situation of individual sectors and the individual income levels in these sectors. Considering the low individual income level and overall difficult economic situation in forestry, water resource management, and construction, for example, it was logical for employment to decline in these sectors. But the number of workers also decreased in insurance agencies, associated labor design organizations, and coastal traffic, which latter led the various sectors of the economy in individual income level. In contrast, employment rose in factories making finished textile goods, although as a whole these factories are constantly in a difficult economic situation, with the individual incomes of their personnel are among the lowest.

There are no apparent patterns chiefly because of the difference in policies adopted in the individual republics and provinces. In some employment and hiring obey economic criteria, but political and social criteria prevail in others. Of the individual regions, employment increased (compared to the first 6 months of 1987) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (by 21.4 percent), Croatia (0.3 percent), Serbia proper (1.3 percent), Kosovo (2.3 percent), and Vojvodina (0.1 percent), while it declined in Montenegro (by 2 percent), Macedonia (0.2 percent), and Slovenia (0.4 percent). However, both political and legal pressures to increase public-sector employment are obviously losing their last battle. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, a large-scale employment campaign has been organized over the last few years, one involving numerous fees, voluntary contributions, loans, and other sources of financing for creation of new jobs. It was supposed to have led to hiring of an additional 100,000 persons beyond current employment growth. However, the anticipated results have not been forthcoming. The large amount of money spent has resulted in only slightly higher employment. In 1 year employment in Bosnia and Herzegovina rose a total of 14,000 persons, mostly in the area of handicrafts, the hotel and restaurant industry, and tourism.

Unemployment is growing at a faster pace from month to month in this situation. By the end of October, 1,153,933 persons had sought employment through employment agencies, 5.8 percent more than over the

same period last year. Each month 1,118,229 persons on the average looked for jobs over the January-June period, 252,159 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (4.1 percent more than over the same period last year), 42,588 in Montenegro (9.1 percent more), 134,761 in Croatia (8.4 percent more), 139,969 (0.5 percent fewer than a year earlier), 19,707 in Slovenia (38.3 percent more), and 529,045 in Serbia (2.2 percent more)—307,234 in Serbia proper (2.5 percent more), 132,412 in Kosovo (3.1 percent), and 89,399 in Vojvodina (0.1 percent more). The sharpest rise in unemployment was in Slovenia, where the number of persons seeking work over this period increased more in absolute terms (5,458) than in Kosovo (4,028).

Among the unemployed 33.6 percent are unskilled workers, 9.2 percent have little education or are semiskilled, 20.6 are skilled and highly skilled, 30.7 percent have completed intermediate education, 2.7 percent have higher education, and 3.2 percent are highly educated. Approximately 70 percent of the unemployed are seeking employment for the first time. In other words, they for the most part represent new generations of educated personnel. Many, however, are not so new, in that increasing numbers have been on the employment agency rolls for 5, 6, or more years.

The statistics kept by the Federal Bureau for Employment Affairs also show that the associated labor organizations are less interested in employing new workers. Over the January-July period of 1987 and 1986, labor organizations and other public-sector agencies submitted an average of 93,000 personnel requisitions each month but only 74,000 in 1988. Only 62,806 vacancies were announced in July 1988, 23 percent fewer than in July of 1987. The earlier average ratio of approximately 11 unemployed to each job vacancy has now risen to more than 15 to 1. However, only about 65 percent of this number of vacancies are filled. The main reasons for this incomplete response by the unemployed are, firstly, that chiefly unskilled workers are sought, and at that only for a certain amount of time in individual projects, and, secondly, that the associated labor organizations often announce personnel needs for purely formal reasons, to fill the vacancies prescribed for the systematization process or seemingly to meet their legal obligations toward beginning employees, even if they have no intention of actually hiring new workers at this time.

In any event it is to be expected that unemployment will continue to grow at a faster pace in Yugoslavia in the immediate future, and it is not clear how determined the associated labor organizations will be in acting to solve the problem of technological surplus or excess employees or how much they will avail themselves of the opportunity of replacing nontechnical and unqualified personnel in the technological and operational restructuring with specialists on the rolls of the employment agencies.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

29 March 1989